Toward a philosophy of educational computing. by Martyn, Timothy O.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1975
Toward a philosophy of educational computing.
Timothy O. Martyn
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martyn, Timothy O., "Toward a philosophy of educational computing." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 4599.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/4599
iiaotb QE^b b?si i 
FIVE COLLEGE 
DEPOSITORY 
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY 
OF 
EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING 
A Dissertation Presented 
By 
TIMOTHY 0. MARTYN 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION 
December, 1975 
School of Education 
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING ii 
A Dissertation 
By 
Timothy 0. Martyn 
Approved as to style and content by: 
Dr. Howard A. Peelle, Chairperson 
lAawu/at ^ PsjlX 
Dr. Portia C. Elliott, Member 
/ 
Dr. Frank C. Grella, Member 
. Louis Fischer, Acting Dean 
School of Education 
ii 
SPONSORING COMMITTEE 
Dr. Portia Elliott, Professor 
School of Education, University of Massachusetts 
Dr. Frank Grella, Professor 
School of Business and Public Administration 
University of Hartford 
Dr. Howard Peelle, Professor (Chairman) 
School of Education, University of Massachusetts 
iii 
DEDICATION 
To Janet, for many reasons 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The recognition I wish to extend to Portia Elliott, 
Frank Grella, and Hap Peelle far exceeds mere acknowledge¬ 
ment. As members of my dissertation committee, they have 
provided scholarly insights and offered constructive 
criticism, the value of which cannot be overstated. 
More importantly, however, I consider it my good fortune 
to have become associated with these persons in that their 
contributions were more than academic. It is with sincere 
gratitude that I recognize the guidance, encouragement, and 
patience that each individual afforded me as I struggled to 
express the ideas contained in this document. 
The editing and typing of this document was entrusted 
to June Molava and Nancy Thomas. I would also like to 
express my appreciation for their efforts on my behalf. 
v 
ABSTRACT 
Toward A Philosophy of Educational Computing 
(December 1975) 
Timothy 0. Martyn, B.A., Providence College 
M.A., Trinity College, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Howard A. Peelle 
This document reflects the thinking of a practitioner in the area 
of educational computing who has endeavored to place his trade within 
the context of educational philosophy. Being acutely aware of the 
necessity to specify well-defined objectives for automated systems and 
recognizing the potential within the computer for actually achieving 
such objectives, the author argues that the very desirability of the 
objectives themselves should be given serious attention. This imme¬ 
diately leads to contemplating those eternal questions surrounding 
the purpose of education. Therefore, it is the author’s contention, 
and a primary theme of this document, that educators involved with 
computerized systems formulate some conscious philosophy of educational 
computing. This philosophy of educational computing should be derived 
from and consistent with some parent philosophy of education. 
vi 
The author acknowledges that the selection of a parent 
philosophy of education from one of the many "isms” found in various 
anthologies of educational philosophy, or perhaps the development of 
one’s own unique philosophic position, is very much a matter of 
personal predisposition. However, upon considering much of the valid 
criticism which has been leveled at educational computing, the author 
adopts existentialism as his parent philosophy. Illustrating that 
educational computing can be compatible with an existential philosophy 
of education is the second major theme of this paper. The author 
demonstrates this compatibility by an analysis of cybernetics (as the 
science encompassing digital computing) from an existential perspective 
and argues that there are no intellectual inconsistencies in their 
positions. Furthermore, it is proposed that the existential educator 
may utilize cybernetic insights in defense of his philosophic position. 
The author concludes by specifying some recent research efforts 
in the instructional applications of computers which display considerable 
merit toward the realization of existential objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Author's Predisposition 
The author of this document speaks of educational computing 
as a practitioner actively involved in the design and implementation 
of computerized systems within an academic environment. More pre¬ 
cisely , he speaks as a practitioner who some years ago began to look 
beyond the sphere of design and implementation and seriously ask 
"WHY?" questions regarding the objectives of educational computing. 
In pursuing answers to these questions, the professional literature 
of the educational technologist was of little help. 
It appears that, with the best of intentions, those involved 
with educational computing have spent a disproportionate amount of 
time and energy toward achieving goals on the assumption that such 
goals were naturally worthy of realization. As a group, educational 
technologists have been guilty of a common sin which Charles Silberman 
has specified as the central problem within American education and 
labeled "mindlessness," namely, the failure of most educators to 
"think seriously or deeply about the purposes and consequences of 
education." In sympathy with Silberman, and being acutely aware of 
the powerful impact the computer is having on education, the author 
states that the primary message of this document is to encourage 
his colleagues to ponder the "WHY?" questions of education, 
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especially regarding the uses of computers. Specifically, 
they are encouraged to develop some conscious "philosophy of 
educational computing" derived from and consistent with a parent 
philosophy of education. 
In this paper a philosophy of educational computing based 
upon Existentialism is advocated. The reader is invited to 
examine the author's rationale for selecting Existentialism as 
the parent philosophy; hopefully, the reader will find this to be 
persuasive. However, a recognition of the significance of estab¬ 
lishing some philosophical basis for educational computing is more 
important than the selection of a particular philosophy. 
(For instance, the author would sincerely welcome the exposition of 
an experimental philosophy of educational computing or a scholastic 
philosophy of educational computing.) This is not to say that the 
selection of the parent philosophy is an arbitrary matter; it is 
a vital issue, but not to be pursued here. In this document, 
the author, as a practitioner, reflects upon educational computing, 
and then selects Existentialism as his parent philosophy of education. 
The tenets of Existentialism are then axiomatic. The intent of this 
paper becomes the incorporation of educational computing within this 
philosophy, not vice versa, where the "tail wagging the dog 
phenomenon occurs and the technology dictates educational policy. 
The intellectual challenge taken up by the author is the illustration 
xi 
that educational computing is not incompatible with an existential 
education and, furthermore, that by allowing the computer into 
the classroom under certain circumstances, existential goals may be 
more readily achieved. 
The Audience 
This paper is addressed to both the practitioner involved with 
educational computing and the existential educator. As a practitioner, 
the author encourages his colleagues to become aware of the necessity 
for some philosophical perspective, and advocates the merits of the 
existential position. As an educator sympathetic toward the existen¬ 
tial position, he encourages other existential educators to recognize 
both the potential dangers inherent within educational computing and 
the positive role the computer can play in promoting a creative, 
humanistic educational environment. In addressing both groups of 
educators, the author specifies their common interests and recommends 
that each group may benefit by recognizing the productive insights 
generated by the academic efforts of the other. 
An Overview 
This paper can be perceived as an attempt at a productive 
cross-fertilization of ideas and concepts proposed by two groups of 
educators. The first group consists of those educators who are 
advocates of existentialism as a philosophy of education. The second 
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group consists of educators who are involved with educational 
computing. Accordingly, some background information on each 
group is presented. 
Chapter I presents an overview and historical account of 
the computer as utilized within an academic setting. Chapter III 
is a brief description of existential philosophy and its educational 
implications. The reader who is familiar with either or both of 
these topics may well omit the corresponding chapter(s). 
The heart of this paper is contained in the remaining 
three chapters, and its organization is quite straightforward. 
In Chapter II, the author indicates the absence of a philosophy of 
educational computing and argues for the construction of such 
a philosophy. Chapter IV is the primary focal point of the paper. 
Here the author examines the science of cybernetics as the theoretical 
science which encompasses digital computing and attempts to convince 
the reader that the philosophic insights provided by cybernetics are 
not incompatible with the basic tenets of Existential philosophy. 
Furthermore, it is proposed that the Existentialist may find cyber¬ 
netic insights useful in an intellectual defense of his position. 
Chapter V concludes with an examination of specific educational policy 
and practices pertaining to educational computing which the author 
believes to be consistent with an existential education. 
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Once I had brains, and a heart also; 
so, having tried them both, I should 
much rather have a heart. 
- The Tin Woodman 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The objective of this introductory chapter is to provide the 
reader with an historical overview of the uses of computer technology 
within an educational environment. It will conclude with a brief 
description of the current status and futuristic projections of this 
topic. 
A. Educational Computing Defined 
Throughout this paper the expression "educational computing" 
will be used in the generic sense to represent any and all applica¬ 
tions of computer technology in the process of education. For the 
sake of discussion, it is helpful to subdivide educational compu¬ 
ting into three categories, according to areas of application. 
These are: (1) Educational Research; (2) School Administration; 
and (3) Instruction. 
1. Educational Research 
The trend toward quantification in educational research, as in 
all social science research, has increased utilization of the com¬ 
puter in its most basic role, that of a most efficient and accurate 
calculating device. The computer’s ability to process large amounts 
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of data according to predefined sequences has made the educa¬ 
tional researcher evermore dependent upon the computer. 
He can now perform calculations which, prior to the advent of 
the computer, would have been impractical due to the effort 
involved. The application of the computer as a calculating 
tool within educational research has been the most successful 
area of educational computing. 
2. School Administration 
A school system is an organization and school administrators 
need accurate and timely information about its status for effec¬ 
tive operation and management. This is the area of data proces¬ 
sing where the impact of the computer has been nothing short of 
revolutionary. Although the automation of school data proces¬ 
sing has progressed slowly, the computer is proving to be an 
invaluable asset to school administrators.^ School systems 
perform functions similar to those of business and industry in 
such areas as accounting, budget development, inventory control, 
and payroll. School administrators have sought to automate 
these procedures as well as others which are unique to school 
administration. For instance, class scheduling, standardized 
test scoring, and grade and attendance reporting have been 
successfully transferred to computerized systems. The applica¬ 
tion of the computer within educational administration has 
evolved without much controversy, barring the exception of 
automated student personnel systems which evoke the privacy issue. 
3. Instruction 
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Research and administration are secondary activities compared 
to the fundamental purpose of schools: educating students in 
the classroom. Here, too, the computer has the potential to become 
a significant factor directly involved in the process of education. 
This is the area of Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI). 
Traditionally, CAI is conceived as a situation in which 
the student interacts with a computer for a period of time and in 
doing so obtains some new knowledge. Most CAI systems have been 
designed to fit the drill-and-practice or tutorial modes of instruc¬ 
tion. Also, some CAI systems have employed simulation and gaming 
techniques. Whereas the applications of computers in educational 
research and administration are relatively straightforward and well 
on their way to maturity, the instructional applications of computers 
are still in an embryonic stage. The above classification of CAI 
has a multitude of variations, and the educational community has 
yet to determine which, if any, has merit within the education 
process. 
Early Perspectives of Educational Computing: Promise and Problems 
During the late 1950's, as the computer was entering the commercial 
world, some educators and members of the computer industry became aware 
of the potential applications of the computer within education. 
Idealistic scenerios were developed calling for research teams 
composed of educators and computer scientists to design computerized 
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systems which would revolutionize the schoolhouse. The motivation 
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for this endeavor on the part of the computer industry was 
obvious—profit. After prototype systems were developed, 
every school system was seen as a potential customer. Various 
segments of the educational community also became enthusiastic 
for different reasons. 
School administrators and members of boards of education, 
being especially sensitive to the rising costs of education, 
envisioned the computer as a means of saving the taxpayers' 
dollars. Not only would the computer streamline the adminis- 
trative functions, but it would also permit more efficient use 
of teachers' time by freeing them from mundane clerical responsi¬ 
bilities. This could also include drill and practice sessions 
which were time-consuming but did not require the skills of 
a professional educator. The hope was that the computer could 
bring the same cost benefits to education that it was bringing 
to business and industry. 
Associated with the idea of utilizing the computer for 
a more efficient allocation of the school's resources was the 
notion that perhaps the entire management and operation of the 
American school system should be modeled after the American business 
enterprise system. Advocates of this concept did not expect the 
schools to turn a profit; however, they did feel that, given the 
financial investment the American taxpayer placed into education, 
the schools should at least be able to achieve their objectives. 
Shortcomings of the schools were pointed out and comparisons 
were made to the success of American business enterprise. It was 
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recommended that not only the computer be Incorporated in the 
school systems but that school administrators begin to think 
managers of a business concerned with efficiency of opera— 
tion. Thus the proposal to utilize computer technology was 
broadened to mean the adoption of the "systems approach" by 
educational administrators.^ 
Other educators who saw promise in the computer were propo¬ 
nents of programmed instruction, including those favoring indivi¬ 
dualized instruction, and educational psychologists favoring 
behaviorism.^ They perceived computer technology as a means of 
achieving their objectives. Conventional CAI systems, presumably 
implemented on large time-share computing systems, would be 
superior to any other media used for programmed instruction, 
would allow the individual student to proceed through the lesson 
at his own pace, and would be behavioristic in that the student 
must respond to a stimulus, systematically presented by the 
computer. The computer, if properly programmed by thoughtful 
educators, could fulfill all these objectives and was seen as 
a blessing for future generations of American students. 
A last group of advocates of educational computing should be 
mentioned for the sake of completeness. These were the "gadget 
lovers." They are difficult to identify because they rationalized 
their enthusiasm for the computer by articulating any or all of 
the aforementioned reasons for use of the computer by educators. 
They were either struck by the mystique of the computer or were 
simply trying to fulfill some publishing quota. 
The computer was not welcomed into the schoolhouse with 
enthusiasm by all. Many educators and social critics, especially 
those who were disenchanted with the undesirable by-products of 
technology and its negative influences on the social structure, 
perceived the computer as a dehumanizing mechanism and thereby 
claimed that it should be barred from the schoolhouse. Such threats 
associated with automation were especially acute during the 1950’s. 
With the development of the computer the threat was extended beyond 
blue-collar jobs into clerical areas. Teacher unions were sensitive 
to this situation and therefore tended to be critical towards 
educational computing. They articulated their criticism in terms 
of its dehumanizing influences, but their altruistic motivation is 
certainly open to debate. 
Historical Events 
Earlier in the previous decade, responding more to the promise 
than the problems within educational computing, the computer industry 
began exploring methods of developing the potentially lucrative 
education market. In order to establish marketing contact with 
the nation's school systems and obtain personnel familiar with educa¬ 
tion, many computer manufacturers purchased educational publishing 
houses; i.e., International Business Machines purchased Science 
Research Associates and General Electric purchased General Learning. 
The major computer manufacturers also began to finance research into 
educational computing in order to stimulate interest and awareness 
on the part of educators.. Government and private foundation funding 
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was also generous, and thus evolved a proliferation of pilot 
projects in educational computing. 
As was mentioned earlier, the applications of administrative 
data processing and educational research proved to be successful, 
and the fruits of this success are becoming evident in today's 
academic institutions. However, while initial evaluation of the 
instructional applications of the computer has been positive, 
it has not been conclusive. Whereas the computer is now commonly 
used in many schools to process clerical transactions, and is 
being used as a calculating device in math and science courses, 
its application as an instructional tool is still minimal. 
Portia Elliott makes reference to the three major pilot 
projects in the instructional applications of computers.^ 
She identifies Patrick Suppes of Stanford, Donald Blitzer of 
the University of Illinois (the PLATO project), and Kenneth 
Stetten of the Mitre Corporation (the MITRE project) as three 
cautious, yet strong, advocates of CAI who have spearheaded 
research into instructional uses of the computer. Elliott 
proceeds to indicate some limitations of conventional CAI as 
represented by these projects and makes reference to current 
pilot projects which, though smaller in scope, are stimulating 
and contain great promise. Chapter V of this paper will examine 
these applications in detail with reference to the philosophy 
of educational computing to be developed. 
D. Analysis 
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The objective of this section is to draw some general obser¬ 
vations pertinent to the brief history of educational computing. 
Much of what will be said will be derived from the one truly 
comprehensive analysis of this subject done by Anthony Oettinger. 
In 1969 Oettinger published the results of this study which he 
conducted at the Harvard University Program on Technology and 
Society. It was a lucid analysis of the then current status of 
educational computing entitled Run, Computer. Run. Most of his 
perceptive conclusions are still applicable. Oettinger focused 
his attention on the typical American school, ignoring both the 
progressive experimental school, the rural one—room schoolhouse, 
and the large urban school. In the process he found that, although 
educational computing held tremendous promise for education, 
time and again in the brief history of computers, glowing experi¬ 
mental results have lost their meaning in the translation from 
pilot scale to useful operating size."7 Instructional applications 
of the computer within the typical American school were generally 
a failure even though the aforementioned research efforts proved 
successful. In his text, Oettinger presents an extensive and 
accurate diagnosis of the causes of the overall failure of educa¬ 
tional computing. Emmanuel Mesthene synthesizes and reaffirms this 
diagnosis in the "Foreword" to Oettinger's book: 
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Both (the educational hardware and institutional 
setting, into which it is being introduced) are 
found wanting. The hardware itself is as yet 
much more primitive than is generally appreciated, 
so that fragile, unreliable, and expensive devices 
often gather dust in the classroom corner once the 
enthusiasm that greeted their arrival has subsided. 
Knowledge about how to apply the technology is even 
more primitive; teaching methods and curriculum 
remain virtually unmodified by the availability of 
new devices. The biggest obstacle to the rapid and 
effective introduction of technology into the 
schools is the structure of the American school 
system itself, which, in Oettinger's words, ’seems 
ideally designed to resist change.'"8 
It will prove advantageous to categorize those factors contri¬ 
buting to the failure of educational computing into two broad 
classes. The first class would contain those factors which are 
external to the educational system. Here we have those problems 
which would hinder the application of computer technology within 
any institutional setting. The second class would contain only 
those factors which uniquely prevent the proper application of 
computer technology within an educational setting. 
1. Prohibitive Factors External to the Educational System 
There were a number of perplexing problems associated with 
the unsophisticated first and second generation computing systems. 
Computer hardware and communication networks were unreliable from 
an engineering perspective. Application systems and programs were 
either poorly designed or restrictive in scope. As a result, 
human users were unable to effectively interact with the computer. 
In particular, teachers, students, and administrators suffered the 
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same inconveniences in communicating with the computer as did 
users within the business and industrial community. Oettinger 
presents an excellent analysis of this situation with respect 
to educational computing: 
Troubles, as we shall see, arise from cost, 
amount, reliability, maintenance, complexity, 
comfort, standardization, integration, and 
content. In short, much longitudinal lead 
time is still between us and the realization 
even of glorified clerical functions.9 
Financing the high initial investment of computing systems 
was a major concern for any institution, educational or otherwise. 
The business community required justification of expenditures in 
terms of clerical savings or valuable information obtained from 
the computing system. Within education, especially in the instruc¬ 
tional applications of computer technology, better instruction, 
not economics, seems to be the rationalization behind utilizing 
the computer. Fortunately, adequate government and foundation 
funding was available to interested schools. However, since the 
publication of Oettinger's book, the economic situation has com¬ 
pletely reversed, and funding for education has diminished drasr 
tically. Thus, over the past five years, lack of sufficient funding 
has limited research into educational computing. 
2. Prohibitive Factors Internal to the Educational System 
Besides the aforementioned traditional problems associated with 
computing systems, there exist problems unique to education which 
prohibit educational computing. The first is the bureaucratic 
structure of the American school system. Oettinger describes 
this problem: 
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Within the educational system, it is difficult 
to find an appropriate audience and, still 
more difficult, a boss to satisfy. Schools 
belong to everyone’s experience. Consequently, 
everyone is aware of them and has an opinion 
about them...Technological change in education 
is, therefore, most often coupled with the 
polity within which educational policies and 
procedures are developed...Whenever some external 
sector of society or the schools themselves press 
for change in the schools, then the schools must 
in turn make their peace with all other linked 
sectors of society. Without external pressures 
or alliances the schools themselves rarely 
initiate change. If change seems undesirable to 
the schools but the external pressures are strong, 
the schools, like any institution, tend to adopt 
evasive tactics which take the form of change 
without the commitment to its substance.10 
Closely associated with the bureaucratic problems of the 
American school system is the problem of educational objectives. 
Educators simply could not adequately define their educational 
goals and, therefore, the computer technician eventually designed 
systems which were unsatisfactory. (A parallel situation exists 
in business and industry wherein the manager does not know, or 
is incapable of communicating, his information needs to the 
systems analyst. As a result, costly and/or ineffective systems 
are produced.) The question of educational goals is an important 
one. Oettinger gives it serious attention as a primary factor 
behind unsatisfactory educational applications of the computer. 
(.See Section 2.1, "Goals Stated," and Section 2.2, "Goals Rea¬ 
lized," of Run, Computer, Run.) 
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We shall return to the matter of educational objectives In the 
following chapter. It Is sufficient at this point to recognize 
that their absence Is a significant factor prohibiting the proper 
application of educational computing. 
Computers and Education - 1975 
Computer technology has yet to revolutionize education. 
Rather, as America has continued to evolve toward a more techno¬ 
logical society, the school, as a microcosm of that society, has 
continued to evolve in the same direction. Although the grandiose 
projections of the 1950’s are far from realization, the computer 
is slowly becoming an integral component of American education. 
Within the areas of educational research and school adminis¬ 
tration, the computer is no longer even novel. For example, 
graduate students pursuing advanced degrees in educational research 
are expected to be at least capable of executing statistical 
programs and many elect courses in computer programming. Students 
pursuing advanced degrees in educational administration are 
encouraged to familiarize themselves with the basic concepts of 
data processing. The fact that proficiency in a computer programming 
language such as FORTRAN, COBOL, or BASIC is now accepted as ful¬ 
filling the language requirement in doctoral programs by many presti¬ 
gious universities testifies as to the acceptance the computer has 
received. 
Within the instructional area the computer has made steady 
progress but has yet to reach the level attained within adminis¬ 
tration and research. The curriculum of many high schools now 
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reflects courses in data processing and computer programming; 
and many courses in various disciplines and at all levels use 
some basic form of CAI in conjunction with the standard classroom 
experience.11 Currently, the application of CAI is limited, 
utilizing primarily the drill and practice or tutorial mode, 
and is usually associated with quantifiable disciplines. Also, 
its application is predominantly in those school systems which 
are located in affluent communities or those few fortunate enough 
to obtain funding. However, it should be emphasized that such is 
only the general situation today. There are exceptions, and 
CAI research and development, although not as extensive as in 
the previous decade, is more realistic and provocative. This 
subject will be addressed in detail in Chapter V. 
Summary and Perspectives for the Future 
Two observations are significant in trying to ascertain the 
future status and impact of educational computing. The first 
pertains to those factors which were external to the school system 
and prohibitive with respect to educational computing. Cost, relia¬ 
bility, maintenance, standardization, etc., which were identified 
by Oettinger as serious problems in 1969, have received the atten¬ 
tion of the computer industry. Although these problems have not 
been eliminated, significant progress has been made. The basic 
indicators of this fact are the number of computers which are now 
in use throughout the United States, and the continued decrease in 
cost associated with the computer.12 Computer technology and 
the science of systems have made major advances over the past 
five years, and even a conservative futuristic projection would 
indicate continued progress. The second observation pertains to 
those factors which were internal to the American school system 
and inhibited educational computing. Unlike the technological 
problems which are in the process of being solved, the educa¬ 
tional problems remain as Oettinger described them. Th» A,,...,.- 
cratic structure of the American school system and its lack of 
well-defined goals continue to hamper educational comnuHnu. 
Due to technological improvements, the cost of a small 
computing system can be financed by many school systems. And, 
because a "good" school has a computer, the computer is becoming 
less of a luxury and more of a necessity. It is important to 
emphasize that the evolution toward educational computing is 
occurring without the sensationalism of the previous decade, 
but the serious philosophical questions which were raised then 
s^ill remain unanswered. The internal educational problems of 
goals and bureaucratic structure serve to slow down the imple¬ 
mentation of computers in schools. (Ironically, if one sides 
with the humanist in rejecting educational computing, these 
problems serve to its advantage.) However, it is only a matter 
of time before the computer will make its way into the class¬ 
room, and, if the problem of objectives with respect to educa¬ 
tional computing persists, the results could be disastrous. 
Unless educators become aware of the implications of educational 
computing and establish their objectives accordingly, 
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the tail wagging the dog" phenomenon could result wherein 
the technology dictates the educational policy. 
An examination of current educational literature reveals 
that educational computing is not receiving the attention it 
did during the previous decade. (Simply, it has "gone out of 
style. ) Yet the issue is even more crucial in that is is no 
longer purely academic. The technological obstacles are being 
eliminated. At the risk of crying "Wolf! Wolf!" for the second 
time, this author recommends that educators give serious atten¬ 
tion to their choice of educational objectives in light of the 
impact of educational computing. More specifically, it is 
crucial that educators involved with computer technology 
proceed beyond debating the pros and cons of the computer and 
formulate what may be called a comprehensive "philosophy of 
educational computing." Here, this means the establishment of 
educational policies and practices derived from and consistent 
with a predetermined philosophy of education. The remainder of 
this paper is devoted to the development of such a philosophy. 
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CHAPTER I 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Louis Bright, Associate Commissioner for Research, U. S. Office 
of Education, has stated: ’’Computers have already altered both 
the techniques and concepts of school administration at elementary, 
secondary, and higher levels of education." Joseph Margolin and 
Marion Misch, Eds., Computers in the Classroom (London: 
MacMillan Co., Ltd.), 1970, p. x. 
2. Patrick Suppes* statement is among the most grandiose of futuristic 
projections. He states: "One can predict that in a few more years 
millions of school children will have access to what Philip of 
Macedon's son Alexander enjoyed as a royal prerogative: the per¬ 
sonal services of a tutor as well-informed and responsive as 
Aristotle." 
Patrick Suppes, "The Uses of Computers in Education," Information, 
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company), 1966, p. 157. 
3. Henry Chauncey, President, Educational Testing Service, reflects 
this attitude: "Also, with the rising cost of education we shall 
need to seek more efficient and productive ways of running our 
schools and colleges, so that we know more accurately what we are 
getting for our money as we seek that level of quality which we 
all desire so much for our children. This is known in the jargon 
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CHAPTER II 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING: THE ABSENCE AND THE NECESSITY 
Before proceeding to develop the proposed philosophy of educa¬ 
tional computing, it will be meaningful to illustrate the absence of 
such from relevant academic literature, and then justify its inclusion. 
Chapter II is written with these objectives in mind. 
A. Absence of a Philosophy of Educational Computing 
1. The Absence 
The absence of any comprehensive philosophy of educational 
computing can be observed by examining the literature on computer 
use in education. However, it will prove helpful to first take a 
broader perspective and comment briefly on the literature covering 
computers and society. In general, although much has been written 
on this topic, one is disappointed in searching for philosophical 
foundations which provide guidelines for the application of the 
computer in the social sphere. Harold Sackman's observation is 
most appropriate on this point: 
All sorts of articles, books, and stories have 
been written about the impact of computers and 
society. Some jaded readers may respond instinc¬ 
tively to the title of this chapter ('Computers, 
the Scientific Spirit, and Evolving Society') as 
just another Sunday supplement on the thrills, 
chills, and spills of computers in the scheme of 
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things to come. The vast and continuing exposure 
of the subject in the mass media of communication, 
although often jarring and tiresome, nevertheless 
reflects a growing and deep concern, at virtually 
all social levels, over the implications of 
computers and for our own and for future societies. 
There is no coherent philosophy in this literature 
that proposes the systematic application of compu¬ 
ters toward the extension of experimental method 
in social affairs.^ 
Sackman's thrills, chills, and spills" is an accurate characteriza¬ 
tion of most literature on computers and society. However, important 
exceptions to his statement exist in the writings of Jacques Ellul, 
Victor Ferkiss, Emanuel Mesthene, Marshall McLuhan, Lewis Mumford, 
Norbert Wiener, and Sackman himself. These individuals have gone 
beyond descriptive statements and engaged in thought-provoking analysis 
of the nature and impact of technology. Of these, only Ferkiss, Sack- 
man, and Wiener have progressed beyond analysis and proposed global 
philosophical structures to guide future technological development. 
Ferkiss describes three basic elements of a new philosophy to guide 
the creation of technological man: new naturalism, new holism, and 
new immanentism.^ Sackman proposes a philosophy of scientific system 
development based upon two broad cornerstones: the methodology of 
3 
Dewey's experimentalism and humanistic automation. And, Wiener estab¬ 
lishes cybernetics as the only perspective for dealing with social 
problems.^ 
Returning to the more restrictive area of computers and education, 
we note that, although some of the aforementioned scholars have made 
reference to education, none have specifically developed a philosophy 
of educational computing. A significant portion of the literature 
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falls into the pragmatic "how to" category which describes computer 
hardware, educational software, and associated pedagogy. There is 
also a large body of literature which describes the advantages and 
I 
disadvantages of educational computing, some of which falls into 
the "thrills, chills, and spills" category. 
The shortcomings of this literature lie in evaluation. The authors’ 
conclusions, pro and con, are typically premised upon some previously 
assimilated, but inarticulated, philosophy of education. For example, 
they might conclude that the computer is an effective means of teaching 
modular arithmetic without formally articulating the value and purpose 
of teaching modular arithmetic in the first place. Evaluations of 
educational computing are limited in that it is the effectiveness of 
the system in achieving some predetermined goal that is measured. 
Very little is said about re-evaluating the desirability of the goal 
itself. Nowhere in the literature on computers and education do we 
find an educator who has explicitly developed a comprehensive 
philosophy of educational computing derived from and consistent with 
a consciously articulated philosophy of education. Taking the first 
steps toward one such philosophy is the primary objective of this 
paper. 
2. The Reasons for the Absence 
Two factors are responsible for this absence of a philosophy of 
educational computing. The first factor is the relatively short 
history of automatic computing. The high-speed digital computer is 
just thirty years old. This is too short a time period for the full 
impact of computing to be recognized and incorporated within a philo¬ 
sophy of education. The second factor is that there is no parent 
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philosophy of education recognizable within the American school 
system. This is the primary reason for the absence of a philosophy of 
educational computing. Grosseman and Howe note the significance of 
a parent philosophy of education: 
A sound philosophy of education must precede 
a philosophy of automated systems. Without 
an educational philosophy and the concomitant 
goals, any attempt at automation would result 
in merely mechanizing existing operations with 
the result of doing needless things faster.-* 
The vast majority of American educators have no such philosophy 
of education. This point is a central theme of Charles Silberman's 
Crisis in the Classroom. Silberman criticizes prominent educators for 
their lack of philosophical perspective: 
The fashion in contemporary writing about education 
holds that talk about purpose is a frightful bore. 
Dr. James Conant, probably the most prestigious and 
influential contemporary student of education, has 
confessed that a 'sense of distasteful weariness' 
overtakes him whenever he hears someone discussing 
educational goals and philosophy. 'In such a mood,' 
he writes, 'I am ready to define education as what 
goes on in schools and colleges' —a definition 
that has prevented him from asking whether or not 
what now goes on should go on. Martin Mayer, an 
influential educational journalist, is equally dis¬ 
dainful of talk about goals. ’It is well to rid 
oneself of this business of the aims of education,' 
he states flatly in his book The Schools. 'Discus¬ 
sions on this subject are among the dullest and 
most fruitless of human pursuits.'6 
Furthermore, Silberman attaches the label of "mindlessness" to 
the attitude reflected by Conant and Mayer, and concludes that it is 
the central problem of American education: 
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What is mostly wrong with the public schools 
is not due to venality or indifference or 
stupidity, but to mindlessness...Teachers, 
principals, and superintendents are decent, 
intelligent, and caring people who try to do 
their best by their lights. If they make a 
botch of it, and an uncomfortable large 
number do, It is because it simply never 
occurs to more than a handful to ask why 
they are doing what they are doing—to think 
seriously or deeply about the purposes or 
consequences of education.7 
Silberman's challenge to mindlessness requires each individual 
educator to become acutely aware of his philosophy of education. 
Every individual has some set of values, a "philosophy," which 
strongly influences his behavior. However, very often this set of 
values is unknown to the individual. This condition, unfortunately, 
applies to the majority of educators. The result is mindlessness. 
It can be rectified only if a significant number of individual educa¬ 
tors begin to "think seriously and deeply about the purposes and 
consequences of education." They must become conscious of their 
"philosophy" and begin the process of formulating a real philosophy 
of education to serve as a guide in developing educational policy 
and practices. 
The formulation of a philosophy of education is a difficult and 
very often frustrating task which is never really completed. (This 
topic will be addressed further in Chapter III.) However, at this 
point, it should be emphasized that a philosophy of education is 
more than a list of educational objectives. Geoffrey Squires' 
comment on this point is most accurate: 
Lists of broad educational objectives, such as 
those developed by the Educational Testing 
Service for the State of Pennsylvania appear 
to have very little logical or epistemological 
coherence - rather they seem to be an accretion 
of various discrete aims and objectives. There 
is no integrated picture of man behind them; 
instead, a multiplicity of roles and skills which 
may be balanced but have no sense of interior 
unity. 
A second problem with such lists of educational objectives is 
that they are simply ignored and therefore have little or no rela¬ 
tionship to reality. Oettinger refers to this situation in his 
analysis of educational computing: 
It is, however, worthwhile asking what relation 
stated goals have to reality. If the two are 
close, then statements have not only their 
undeniable political value, but they may also 
be taken at face value in guiding systems analysis. 
If, however, reality is at variance with the words, 
one may expect to find in education the confusion 
and discomfort attending the simultaneous keeping 
of two sets of intellectual books. As we shall see, 
there is a sharp break between rhetoric and reality, 
with interesting political and technological reper¬ 
cussions . ^ 
If the disparity between educational objectives and reality is 
to be avoided, educators must consciously establish a coherent 
philosophy of education to serve as a framework within which to 
develop a philosophy of educational computing. As we shall see 
in the next section, the evolution of educational technology has 
made the need for such a philosophy all the more imperative. 
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B. Need for a Philosophy of Educational Computing 
The need for a philosophy of educational computing becomes appar¬ 
ent when one considers the powerful effects computers can have on 
educational systems. Of course, it is foolish to undertake even the 
most mundane and insignificant task without some particular objec¬ 
tive in mind. Most "modern" educators, as disciples of the systems 
approach, are very cognizant of this point. However, their emphasis 
is often directed toward the implementation of the systems approach 
in behavioristic terms, with minimal attention given to philosophical 
justification of the system’s objectives. 
This applies especially to educators involved with educational 
computing. If educational computing were a mundane venture with 
trivial impact upon the educational process, there would be little 
need for such philosophical justification. But, this is not the case. 
An examination of the literature on computer technology predicts 
a profound impact by the computer in the near future. 
If we agree with Victor Ferkiss in his comprehensive analysis of 
the impact of technology, the technological revolution is nothing 
less than an "existential revolution." Ferkiss elaborates on his 
interpretation of this expression: 
Humanity today is on the threshold of self¬ 
transfiguration, of attaining new powers over 
itself and its environment that can alter its 
nature as fundamentally as walking upright or 
use of tools. No aspect of man's existence 
can escape being revolutionized by this funda¬ 
mental fact - all his self-consciousness that 
we call culture, his patterns of interaction 
that we call society, his very biological 
structure itself. 
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The computer is one very significant component of this techno¬ 
logical/existential revolution. Its potential impact with respect 
to education will be examined in detail in Chapter IV. At this 
point it is only necessary to acknowledge the power it affords those 
who control the computer. It is the magnitude of this power as 
applicable to education which creates the need for a philosophy of 
educational computing. Before elaborating on this statement, it will 
be useful to examine an analogous situation—in medical technology— 
which is more pressing and probably more familiar to the reader due 
to its coverage by the popular media. 
The relationship between power and the need for philosophical 
guidelines is dramatically exemplified within the area of medical 
technology. Prior to the development of modern medical technology, 
the Hippocratic oath provided an adequate set of ethical guidelines 
for the physician to follow. The physician was required to do everyr- 
thing within his power to preserve the life of his patient. 
Because the physician had such little power relative to the forces of 
nature, the ethic of the Hippocratic oath was quite workable and 
farely presented him with a moral dilemma. This is no longer the case. 
Medical technology has virtually created a biological revolution. 
The physician is now able to preserve life under circumstances which 
heretofore would have been impossible. This situation raises new 
questions concerning the quality of life and the very definition of 
life itself. Research into the area of genetics and the birth of the 
science of eugenics indicate that the future will only present more 
difficult questions to be answered. 
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It is important to note that these questions have always been 
given consideration by both physicians and philosophers. However, 
it was always within the realm of the hypothetical. In the actual 
practice of medicine, it was the simple, but effective, Hippocratic 
oath which the ethical physician followed. New medical technology 
has given tremendous new powers to the physician. It has forced 
a reconsideration of the Hippocratic oath as well. There are many 
situations where a simplistic interpretation of this ethical code is 
no longer satisfactory for physicians who sincerely have the best 
interest of their patients at heart. The power given the physician 
now forces him to make existential decisions. For example, he is now 
occasionally called upon to decide if a human life is worth main¬ 
taining by extraordinary artificial means. Therefore, either the 
community of physicians must collectively develop a more workable 
ethic, or the individual physician must determine his own. 
In either case, the presence of a new power increases the need for 
philosophical guidelines. 
The evolution of a parallel situation is just beginning in 
education. The advent of behavioral control technologies will 
afford those in control of education the power to achieve their 
educational objectives. Given this power, the need for a philosophy 
of education becomes all the more imperative. 
The digital computer will be a significant component of any 
comprehensive behavioral control system. As London, in his study 
of behavioral control, comments: 
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While all these new developments 
affecting individuals are proceeding, 
computer technology...discovers better 
and better data-processing methods, 
making it easier all the time to track 
and predict virtually any kind of mass 
behavior trend; this makes it easier, 
in turn, to forecast, then control, 
individuals who make up the mass.11 
Besides its data processing capacities there are many other 
ways in which the computer can influence the behavior of students. 
These will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Here it is only 
necessary to emphasize the existential power inherent in the computer. 
We do so by referring to Norbert Wiener, a giant figure in the area 
of cybernetics. In God & Golem, Inc., Wiener goes to great lengths 
to dramatize the power inherent within the computer and, more impor¬ 
tantly, the tremendous danger in exercising this power. He cites 
three simple legends, "Thousand Nights and a Night," "The Sorcerer's 
Apprentice," and "The Monkey's Paw," to illustrate his point. 
Quoting directly from Wiener: 
The theme of all these tales is the danger 
of magic. This seems to lie in the fact 
that the operation of magic is singularly 
literal-minded, and that if it grants you 
anything at all, it grants you what you 
ask for, not what you should have asked for 
or what you intend.12 
Wiener continues: 
The magic of automation...may be expected 
to be similarly literal-minded. If you are 
playing a game according to certain rules 
and set the playing-machine to play for 
victory if you get anything at all, and 
the machine will not pay the slightest atten¬ 
tion to any consideration except victory accor 
ding to the rules.13 
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Returning to educational computing, we must recognize that 
the computer will bestow upon the educator powers of unprecedented 
magnitude. The availability of such power demands a philosophy of 
educational computing to guide the educator in determining the 
appropriate circumstances for its application. This philosophy 
must be based upon a philosophy of education which gives serious 
attention to educational objectives. For, with the application of 
computer technology, there will be greater chance that these objec¬ 
tives will be realized. The future will see the educator confronting 
the same crisis of choice with which the modern physician is just 
beginning to grapple. Only at a superficial level is there a distinc¬ 
tion in their positions. Both must come to some conclusions, however 
tentative, regarding the basic questions of philosophy. Yet, unlike 
their predecessors, they will be forced to make decisions based upon 
their philosophy. Technology will have removed their choice of 
philosophy from the realm of the hypothetical. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXISTENTIALISM AND EDUCATION 
A. Existentialism 
Existentialism is not a systematic philosophy in the conventional 
sense. Rather, it is a label representing the philosophic position of 
a number of individuals who have reacted against the traditional 
philosophical systems of Western civilization. Or, as Kaufmann has 
said of existentialism: 
The refusal to belong to any school of thought, 
the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of 
beliefs whatever, and especially of systems, 
and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional 
philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote 
from life - that is the heart of existentialism.^ 
The existential movement has expressed itself in literature, drama, 
philosophy, psychology, and theology. In these areas the following 
individuals have become prominent as representatives of the existential 
position: Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Sartre, Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Camus, Kafka, Beckett, Tillich, Buber, Marcel, and Frankl. 
There are, of course, significant differences in the positions held by 
these individuals. In fact, a number have specifically rejected the 
existential label because of strong disagreement with Sartre, one of 
the few who acknowledges the term. However, commentators on the exis- 
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tential movement feel justified in classifying these writers together 
because of their collective rejection of traditional systematic 
philosophy and their willingness to address common themes. These 
themes surround the subtective dimension of man, a subject which is 
either rejected or ignored by modern scientific philosophies. 
Strain emphasizes this point: 
Existential thinking focuses on the notion of 
paradox, despair, anxiety, absurdity, faith, 
hope, and love to indicate a man’s personal 
relationships to the world, to others, and to 
himself.2 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide the reader with 
a comprehensive perspective of Existentialism. Such a perspective, 
though not vital to understanding the remainder of this paper, is recom¬ 
mended and thus the interested reader is encouraged to consult the 
bibliography for further information. What immediately follows is only 
the skeleton of existential thought as specified by Jean-Paul Sartre 
in his Existentialism and Humanism. Most Existentialists would probably 
accept the following statements as valid but might soon disagree if 
they engaged in a serious discussion on their interpretation. Sartre 
is quoted to illustrate the following four concepts which are consi¬ 
dered to be intrinsic to Existentialism: 
1. Existentialism is first and foremost a philosophy of man 
as a subjective being. 
Man is nothing else but that which he makes 
of himself. That is the first principle of 
Existentialism. And this is what people call 
its 'subjectivity,' using the word as a reproach 
against us. But what do we mean to say by 
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this, but that man is of a greater dignity than 
a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man 
primarily exists - that man is, before all else, 
something which propels itself toward a future 
and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, 
a project which possesses a subjective life, 
instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus, 
or a cauliflower.3 
2. Man is free to choose; in fact, man must choose. 
Subjectivity means, on the one hand, the freedom of 
the individual subject and, on the other, that man 
cannot pass beyond human subjectivity, It is the 
latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism. 
When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that 
every one of us must choose himself.^ 
3. Man is responsible for his choices. 
Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts 
every man in possession of himself as he is, and places 
the entire responsibility for his existence squarely 
upon his own shoulders.^ 
4. Choosing and being responsible for his choices involves 
anguish. 
The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish. 
His meaning is as follows: When a man commits himself 
to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing 
what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legis¬ 
lator deciding for the whole of mankind - in such a moment 
man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound 
responsibility.° 
The concepts of subjectivity, free choice, responsibility, and 
anguish are central to existential thought. The approach to these 
concepts varies among individual existentialists and very often, as we 
shall see, leads to other related concepts involving the existential 
state of man. In order to pursue this discussion of existentialism 
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further, it will be most helpful to borrow a structure recommended by 
Van Clev Morris in his text entitled Philosophy and the American 
School.^ Here he advocates describing a philosophy in terms of its 
ontology, epistemology, and axiology. We shall do so, and also make 
extensive use of his insights bearing on the relationship of existen¬ 
tialism to education. 
B. The Ontology of Existentialism 
According to Morris the goal of ontology is to answer the question: 
"What is real?" Among the existentialists, Martin Heidegger has given 
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this question the greatest attention. However, since Heidegger s 
writing is probably the most complex of all the existentialists, we 
turn again to Sartre for a clearer explanation of existential ontology. 
He attempts to define the common element within all existential thought 
What they have in common is simply the fact that 
they believe that existence comes before essence - 
or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjec¬ 
tive. 9 
From this simple ontological statement, "existence comes before 
essence," Sartre proceeds to derive his aforementioned conclusions 
concerning choice, responsibility, and anguish as they necessarily 
relate to man. Sartre's position is accurately described by Morris: 
We can, say the Existentialists, develop all kinds 
of interesting theories concerning essence and 
existence in the universe at large. But when we 
come to Man we are stumped. Traditional philoso¬ 
phies have always assumed the priority in time of 
the essence of man over his existence... 
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Existentialism begins by turning this 
priority upsidedown: In Man, existence 
precedes essence. We first are; then we 
attempt to define ourselves... as we per¬ 
form this and that activity, make this and 
that choice, prefer this, reject that, we 
are actually in the process of defining 
ourselves, of providing the essence for 
which we search.10 
According to the Existentialist, man cannot find an answer to the 
disturbing question: "Who am I?" There is no answer to be discovered 
by an ontological investigation. Each individual human being must 
create his own answer; he does so by the choices he makes. And, be¬ 
cause there is no external agency to guide him in this project, he 
alone is responsible for the results of his choices. Herein lies 
the source of anguish which must accompany human choice. 
C. The Epistemology of Existentialism 
Epistemology, in the formal sense of the term (the study of the 
origin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge), has not received 
much attention from existential philosophers. This situation is con¬ 
sistent with their ontological position and not due to any lack of in¬ 
sight or motivation to investigate the subject. Morris explains: 
Now when we use the word choice it is to be under¬ 
stood in its largest and fullest meaning. Making 
a choice is not confined to deciding to do some¬ 
thing. It also includes deciding to believe some¬ 
thing, to accept something as true. Hence we are 
confronted at the outset with the epistemological 
significance of the Existentialist ontology, namely, 
the existential freedom of man in choosing his own 
truth. Each man is his own supreme court of episte¬ 
mological judgment, and he is, therefore, in an ul¬ 
timate sense, absolutely on his own when it comes 
to deciding between candidates for truth. 
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All this suggests that the Existentialist 
has little to offer in a way of a method of 
knowing, a systematic epistemology. Rather, 
he is concerned with pointing out that in 
all knowing—sense perception, logical demon¬ 
stration, scientific proof, intuition, revela¬ 
tion—it is the individual self which must 
make the ultimate decision as to what is, as 
a matter of fact, true. 11- 
While attesting to the validity of the various methods by which 
man comes to know both himself and the universe, the existentialist 
strongly rejects any philosophical position which claims man can 
acquire an understanding of himself by purely objective methods of 
investigation. More specifically, the existentialist is at odds with 
those philosophers who claim that the scientific method is the best or 
the only way man can come to know himself. In acknowledging and giving 
priority to the subjective dimension of man, the existentialist asserts 
that man can and does come to know himself in a sense that cannot be 
incorporated within the scientific method. This condition establishes 
a duality in modes of knowledge. Morris simply calls these "Mode One" 
and "Mode Two," defining them as follows: 
To put this plan in plain language, we can say 
that in Mode One I am conscious of an existential 
world (somewhat in the manner of the Realist;...), 
and that in Mode Two I am also conscious of my 
consciousness of this world. I somehow know my 
own existentiality.^ 
Morris identifies science as a Mode One type of knowing. However, 
for all its successes, the existentialist places a higher priority on 
the Mode Two form of knowing, even though this may be called a 
retreat into mysticism or poetry: 
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Nevertheless, the Existentialist insists on the 
validity, indeed the primacy, of 'Mode Two' knowing. 
Each one of us recognizes this knowing within him¬ 
self. Although we cannot report on it concerning 
other people, we certainly cannot deny its existen¬ 
tial presence within our own being. If this be 
poetry, let it stand. For there is a kind of knowing 
in poetry, after all. Poetry is not sterile of 
epistemological content.13 
Thus we see that the epistemology of the existentialist is an open- 
ended affair, the only definite assertion being the admission of some 
form of a subjective (Mode Two) path to knowledge. 
D. The Axiology of Existentialism 
Axiology, the study of ethics and aesthetics, is, for the existen¬ 
tialist, dictated by his ontological position. Ultimately, it is the 
individual who must determine what is good and beautiful. This may 
involve an unpopular individual act of conscience of a revolt from the 
public norm in the creation or appreciation of a work of art. The indi¬ 
vidual may elect to be guided by some code of ethics or aesthetic 
standard. However, he must first freely choose the particular code or 
standard, and, in so doing, is responsible for this choice. 
The absence of any pre-existing set of guidelines to aid in ethical 
or aesthetic decision-making implies that existential axiology, at its 
most fundamental level, is value free. This is not to profess amorality 
or aesthetic indifference. In fact, especially in the realm of ethics, 
the exact opposite is true. Morris emphasizes this point in his discus¬ 
sion of comparative axiologies: 
If Experimentalism has given over a lion's share of 
its time to value theory, we may safely say that 
Existentialism is almost obsessed with it. For ExiS” 
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tentialism is principally a value theory, 
a philosophy according to which everything 
must pass through a funnel of choice. 
And since choice if fundamentally an exercise 
in valuing, the entirety of philosophical 
content in Existentialism may be described as 
axiological.^ 
Recognizing the existential given fact of necessary human choice 
without any pre-existing standards of value, the existentialist professes 
that it is by exercise of this choice that axiological values are deter¬ 
mined. Quoting again from Morris: 
Let us, says the Existentialist, go the whole way 
in ethical theory and simply say what we must say, 
namely that our values consist of our own choices. 
In choosing we make our values out of nothing. 
No God, no pope, no society can tell me what I must 
value. 
It is the recognition of this reality which leads to the existential 
notion of anguish. Individual existentialists, confronting the anguish 
of choice, have taken varying positions on ethical situations and 
problems. Any attempt to generalize their conclusions is doomed to 
failure. However, it would be safe to say that, because the focal 
point of existential philosophy is man, the literature of existentialism 
has a strong flavor of humanism. Sartre, in response to critics who 
claim existentialism is unjustifiably obsessed with the dark side of 
human existence, has specifically described existentialism as a kind of 
humanism: 
Many people are going to be surprised at what is 
said here about humanism. We shall try to see in 
what sense it is to be understood. In any case, 
what can be said from the very beginning is that 
by existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes 
human life possible and, in addition, declares that 
every truth and action implies a human setting and 
a human subjectivity.16 
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E. Science and Technology: The Existential Perspective 
In general, existential writers tend to emphasize the negative 
dimension of science and technology: 
In terms of its content, modern existential thinking 
focuses on the human person in a technological and 
scientific age. Many existentialists are pessimistic 
about modern life and indicate that utopianism based 
on science is an illusion. They believe science and 
technology have brought human beings loneliness and 
alienation rather than peace and progress. The insti¬ 
tutional organization of science, by and for the state, 
has dehumanized man.17 
For sure, the existentialist is aware of the absurdity of the modern 
age. Thanks to the ingenuity of the technocrat, heads of state now 
engage in "rational" discussion about over-kill weapons systems. 
Realizing that there exists no force inherent in the nature of the 
universe which necessarily dictates the continued existence of man, 
and yet being deeply committed to the preservation of this fragile 
being, the existentialist experiences greater anxiety in the insane 
presence of over-kill weapons systems than one who harbors the human¬ 
ist's vision of an anthropocentric universe. 
This negative perspective of science and technology is justifiable. 
However, an outright rejection of science and technology is not the 
only legitimate position an existentialist may take. This subject 
warrants further investigation. The final chapter will do so within 
the context of educational computing. 
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Existentialism and Education 
Partly due to the fact that existentialism is a very recent 
philosophy, not much has been said explicitly on the subject of 
education by the major existential writers. Among the leading 
existentialists only Martin Buber has given more than a passing 
reference to education. However, secondary commentators on exis¬ 
tentialism and philosophers of education have examined the educa¬ 
tional implications of existentialism. What follows is a brief 
description of the various dimensions of education upon which some 
consensus of opinion among existential educators exists. 
1. The Aims of Education 
Philosophers of education are most consistent regarding the objec¬ 
tives of an existential education. The goals of education are basically 
the goals of existential philosophy itself. Mitchell Bedford, in his 
text, Existentialism and Creativity, enumerates twenty-two such goals 
according to four leading existential philosophers: Soren Kierkegaard, 
Martin Buber, Karl Jaspers, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Eleven of these 
goals, common to all four writers, are listed below: 
1) The starting point for self-knowledge is in 
subjectivity. Man can never divorce himself 
from the subjective. 
2) Man must undertake a search for stability, 
he must not take things for granted, his 
behavior must be purposive; he must be 
purposive, he must will himself to be, he is 
sustained becoming. 
3) Man must seek to know himself. 
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4) Man can alter his situation, elaborate himself; 
man has free choice, he is not in a final situa¬ 
tion, he is free to create. 
5) The authority of man’s action must be based on his 
own choice. There are no compelling external 
situations. 
6) Man must accept his limitations, his fastidiousness, 
his ultimate situations. 
7) Man must accept the fact that life contains tragedy, 
that he must be anxious, that he is problematic to 
himself. 
8) Man is conscious that he exists. He can reflect - 
or is reflection - on his existence. He can transcend 
his physical limitations. He becomes what he is not. 
9) Man is dependent upon the judgment of others for 
maximum self-knowledge. Others help to shape his being. 
10) Man should learn to exist within his community; he needs 
love; he should avoid a crowd. 
11) Man must not force his convictions on other people, 
although he will aid them to want to know themselves.^ 
The aforementioned educational objectives are various aspects of 
the main existential goal, which according to Bedford is "Man must come 
to know himself."^ Thus we see that the educational objectives are 
similar to those of the human potential movement with their desire to 
educate the whole man. The significant difference in these two 
approaches to education is that existentialism emphasizes the individual 
in a radical manner in comparison with humanism. It is also worth 
reiterating at this point Sartre's exposition of existentialism as 
a kind of humanism. Therefore, although the humanist and existentialist 
may differ regarding the ontological status of man and the cosmos, their 
educational objectives are almost identical. 
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2. The Curriculum 
Given the strong humanistic flavor of the existential educational 
objectives, most existential philosophers of education recommend that 
the "humanities” dominate the curriculum. This position is articu¬ 
lated by Morris: 
The Existentialist school would probably start 
from the 'humanities’ end of the curriculum to 
develop its program. That is, it would tend to 
emphasize those subject matters in which private 
choice and decision have greater prominence, 
namely, the arts, philosophy, literature, creative 
writing, the drama, etc. This follows from the 
view that the subjective growth of the individual 
is the most important kind of growth.20 
This is not the only position held by existentialists about the curri¬ 
culum. If one acknowledges freedom and responsibility within the 
student, as the existentialist does, it would be inconsistent to 
demand that the student be limited to a curriculum with any permanent 
bias whatever. Dupuis and Nordberg express this opinion as being 
held by other prominent existentialists: 
It is worth noting, however, that Nietzsche, Kneller, 
and Ralph Harper do not demand that history, science, 
mathematics, and the like be thrown out of the curri¬ 
culum. Their criticism is leveled at the impersonal, 
cold, and dry-as-dust approach to subject matter 
found in schools.21 
They continue: 
The existentialist is not so much concerned with 
the actual courses or subjects in the curriculum 
as he is with what the teacher and (most especially) 
the student does with them. The exercise of exis¬ 
tential freedom within the curriculum is more 
important than the curriculum content. 
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It is this second position on the curriculum which will be 
advocated in the next chapter where educational computing will be 
incorporated within the existentialist's philosophy of education. 
3• Student - Teacher Interaction 
Both the student and the teacher are to be recognized as individual 
human beings engaged in the serious enterprise of education. Their 
relationship should be one of sincere human communication and not 
restricted by unnecessary formal structures. Harper specifies the 
nature of this relationship: 
But whenever there are these three elements, 
the teacher, the pupil, the curriculum, there 
is the possibility of education. Whenever 
two are together with a third thing, which 
takes both out of themselves, there is educa¬ 
tion. And the only difference between pupil 
and teacher is that the teacher leads, while 
the pupil is moved. But he who is moved now 
may in the next sentence, even in his moving, 
lead his teacher, who then becomes the pupil.23 
This implies that education is a natural process which is in no way 
contingent upon the formal notion of "schooling." Yet, planned educa¬ 
tion must take place somewhere, and it is the teacher who is respon¬ 
sible for establishing the educational environment. Buber elaborates 
on this point: 
The world—that is, the whole environment, nature 
and society—'educates' the human being: it draws 
out his powers, and makes him grasp and penetrate 
its objections. What we term education, conscious 
and willed, means a selection by man of the effec¬ 
tive world; it means to give decisive effective power 
to a selection of the world which is concentrated and 
manifested in the educator. The relation in education 
is lifted out of the purposelessly streaming education 
by all things, and is marked off as purpose.3 
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This "selection of the effective world" for the student is 
a delicate matter. The educator must establish conditions and 
carry out a dialogue with the student which will engender the exis¬ 
tential growth of the student, yet avoid imposing his own convic¬ 
tions upon the student. Again we refer to Harper: 
The good teacher aims to produce, not replicas, 
but men and women who stand apart from him even 
more distinctly than when he first met them. 
The good teacher does not want imitators but, 
rather, men and women who through their education 
have experienced the shock of discovering the 
infinite depths of the world and truth without 
giving up any of the partial truths they have 
encountered along the way... A teacher knows he 
has succeeded only when he has evidence that his 
pupils can hold something to be true that he him¬ 
self is convinced is true, without having come to 
this truth by imitating the teacher, by reasoning, 
or by any other powers of persuasion, including 
the persuasion of example.25 
As with the curriculum, there is no single specific methodology 
which the existential educator employs to achieve his objectives. 
In part this is premised on the fact that each student is to be conn 
fronted as the unique individual who he is. The teaching techniques 
should be dictated according to the particular needs and desires of 
the individual student. However, even though there is no absolute 
methodology associated with an existential education, existential 
philosophers have made several recommendations which are worthy of 
consideration. 
Bedford echoes the methodology of the experimentalist in noting that 
"learning is accomplished by 
material." 26 
doing, action, and applying the lesson 
consistent with the existential epistemology, Morris, being 
agrees with Bedford while dramatizing the subjective dimension of 
the student's experience: 
First of all, whatever method of teaching is 
selected and emphasized, it must be one which 
recognizes that the learner learns from the 
inside out, so to speak. This means, among 
other things, that the learner in school must 
be encouraged to identify with his subject 
matter, to identify with it emotionally so 
that he can announce a personal reaction to it. 
Therefore, in every subject matter (if we retain 
the subject curriculum) a real effort must be made 
to involve the learner directly. He must get 
personally tangled up in the subject matter.27 
Kneller sees student participation in simulations as a legitimate 
technique toward stimulation of personal reactions. He describes 
his approach in teaching ancient history to seventh-graders: 
I stress the men themselves who were responsible 
for these events. I consider them as actors 
playing out their respective roles in the great 
encounters of politics. I divide the different 
parts among my class'—Julius Caesar, Pompey the 
Great, Brutus, Mark Anthony, Cicero, Octavianus. 
To relive the past, we must cease to be its 
O O 
spectators and become instead its agents.^0 
Kneller also recommends the revival of the Socratic method as 
a technique to encourage a personal response on the part of the student. 
However, Buber is the existentialist who has the most to say regarding 
the dialogue between the student and teacher. His concept of an 
I - Thou dialogue (vs. an I - It conversation) goes beyond the Socratic 
method in encouraging a deep, sincere, subjective communication between 
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the student and teacher. This is more than a methodology for Buber; 
it is the essence of his philosophy.29 
The aforementioned educational techniques appear to be amenable 
to an existential education although existential educators have had 
little to say regarding the particulars, e^. , student’s age, level 
of intellectual and emotional development, culture, sex, etc., in 
their application. To a certain degree this may be intentional. 
The existentialist is reluctant to specify educational algorithms, 
for it is the teacher’s responsibility to come to know his student 
subjectively, as an individual, and to make decisions accordingly. 
Perhaps the only maxim which can be offered to the teacher is that 
he must set an example himself. He must be actively and consciously 
involved in his own existential growth. Without this prerequisite, 
any methodology is doomed to failure. 
G. Educational Computing 
The issue of educational computing has not been investigated within 
the context of an existential philosophy of education. However, given 
their general distrust of science and technology and radical emphasis 
on the subjective dimension of man, it is reasonable to conclude that 
existential educators would be inclined to reject, rather than accept, 
the computer into the schoolhouse. Yet, this tenuous conclusion merits 
further examination. The issue of educational computing is too complex 
to permit a simplistic good/bad judgment. (This is not to deny 
the legitimacy of the existential educator rejecting the computer 
after serious consideration.) Likewise, the often-heard opinion, 
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"the computer is a tool; it’s neutral; it depends on how it is 
used," is overly simplistic. 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a clarification of 
the issue of educational computing as it pertains to an existential 
philosophy of education. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TOWARD AN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING 
A. Why Existentialism? 
The first and most reasonable question the reader may ask 
is "Why an 'existential* philosophy of educational computing?" 
The answer to this question is threefold: (1) Existential thinking 
focuses on problems unique to the twentieth century—in this case, 
the computer; (2) Misapplication of educational computing threatens 
existential/humanistic values; and (3) The author professes 
a personal predisposition in favor of the existential creed. 
Let us examine each reason in more detail. 
The first reason for favoring existentialism stems from this 
paper's concern with the digital computer, an invention of the 
twentieth century, and perhaps the most powerful and versatile tool 
yet developed by man. The computer, while it has solved many of 
man's problems, has also presented man with new problems which he 
has not encountered historically. (For example, a citizen's right 
to privacy is now threatened by computerized data banks.) 
Existentialism is a philosophy of the twentieth century and addresses 
itself to problems which are developing during this period. 
Quoting from Harper: 
A man born in the twentieth century has problems 
which were not problems for a man living one hundred 
or seven hundred years ago. And existentialism 
directs one's attention to this fact. 
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This position is also articulated by Bedford who claims that 
the twentieth century has had a "catastrophic effect on the 
development of human personality." In offering evidence for this 
opinion, he describes three conditions which, as illustrated below, 
can be associated with misuse of the computer: 
1) There is a great leveling process underway, 
and there is a tendency to think only in 
abstractions or generalities. 
2) The age is one of mechanization, objectifica¬ 
tion of man and organizations - Man is a cog 
in the wheels. 
3) The individual is no longer held responsible 
for what he becomes. He is enmeshed in a 2 
feeling of helplessness. 
It is the potential dangers associated with educational compu¬ 
ting that gives rise to the second reason for advocating an exis¬ 
tential philosophy of educational computing. In the following 
section it will be demonstrated that the many differing criticisms 
so often leveled at educational computing have a common thread; 
namely, each problem can be perceived as a threat to some important 
existential value. (This situation could conceivably justify out¬ 
right rejection of educational computing by existential educators. 
This author is not sympathetic toward such a negative response. 
However, this is not to deny its validity.) This author contends 
that an educational environment permeated with an existential atmos¬ 
phere is a safeguard against the dangers inherent in educational 
computing. The philosophical rationale behind this conclusion will 
be examined thoroughly in Section C. 
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The last and most important reason for advocating an exis¬ 
tential philosophy of educational computing is a personal one. 
Simply, this author chooses to echo the attitude of Bugental who, 
in defending existentialism as the philosophic foundation of his 
humanistic approach to psychotherapy, says: 
In the simplest, most candid terms, the exis¬ 
tential perspective simply feels right. As I 
read what others have written about the exis¬ 
tential perspective, as I employ it in my own 
work, there is a sense of closure and even, 
at times, of elegance.^ 
The brief description of existential philosophy presented 
in the previous chapter stands as the foundation for the philo¬ 
sophy of educational computing to be developed here. It will 
serve as this author’s set of "axioms" because of its appeal in 
being consistent with his personal perspective of man and 
the cosmos. 
B. The Negative Dimension of Educational Computing: An Existential 
Perspective 
In this section the various dangers of educational computing 
will be enumerated. Most of these have already been specified by 
critics of educational computing. Our intention here is to illus¬ 
trate that, upon inspection, one can detect a common thread in this 
criticism: Each insensitive application of educational computing 
promotes conditions which are contrary to existential objectives. 
It is important to recognize that these pitfalls are not overt as 
in the case of nuclear weapons or industrial pollution. Rather, 
their influences are subtle, falling primarily in the realm of 
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psychology, possibly even to be thought of as causing psychic 
destruction. It is beyond the scope of this paper to perform an 
in-depth analysis of each topic examined here. The intention here 
is to simply make reference to the particular negative dimensions 
of educational computing and document their relevancy to exis¬ 
tential philosophy. 
1. Educational Data Banks 
The issue of computers, data banks, and information storage 
and retrieval systems as they relate to a citizen’s right to privacy 
has been the topic of much discussion for which there exists a growing 
body of literature.^ Records maintained by educational institutions 
would necessarily be a significant component of any truly compre¬ 
hensive data bank. Most discussion of the privacy issue is political 
and sociological, reflecting its close association with the estab¬ 
lishment and maintenance of a totalitarian society. Obviously, such 
a society, regardless of its political philosophy, would be repugnant 
to the existentialist. However, the presence of computerized data 
banks can have a psychological impact other than detering rebellious 
activity by fear of detection. In this section we specifically 
examine the negative influences pertinent to educational data banks. 
We focus on this issue as it affects both the teacher and the 
student. 
a. Negative Influences Upon Educators 
The existential educator is expected to be acutely aware of 
and willing to accept the responsibility for the important deci- 
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sions he must make which affect the lives of his students. 
The basis of his decisions should be a knowledge of his students 
as individuals, not as quantifiable objects. However, the modern 
trend is toward the scientific approach to decision-making. 
This has made the computer a welcome tool. And, to the degree 
that it has made possible the manipulation of data in a manner 
which was heretofore impractical, it has reinforced and perpe¬ 
tuated the scientific cult. 
Those who defend use of the computer in decision-making 
emphasize that the computer only provides information for a human 
agent who should always have the final word. In principle, this 
position is correct. If the individuals who make final decisions 
are sympathetic with existential values and do not become enchan¬ 
ted with the mystique of the computer, the information provided 
them could prove to be a legitimate tool for responsible decision¬ 
making. Unfortunately, man is a fragile being who may seek to 
avoid the anguish of making a decision. Our cultural values are 
the Mhard-nosed" analytic approach to problem-solving. There¬ 
fore, the individual who conforms to that cultural pressure and 
formulates an opinion primarily on the basis of computer output 
will be subject to less criticism than one who does not, in the 
event of disaster. 
The authors of Technology and Values at the Harvard University 
Program on Technology and Society, while making no statements 
advocating existentialism as a philosophical system, do reflect 
an awareness of the existential state of man and the dangers 
inherent in computer decision-making: 
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The frailty of man in making decisions increases 
with the growing complexity of the world and the 
diminution in individual identity and responsi¬ 
bility. Today man can more easily escape the 
freedom and responsibility of choice through the 
use of the computer. After all, who can be held 
responsible for a decision by a computer? Man 
looks for someone or something outside himself 
that has the qualities he feels lacking in him¬ 
self—solidity, infallibility, and so on.5 
Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst associated with the existential move¬ 
ment, has made a comprehensive study of man’s tendency to avoid respon¬ 
sibility in his Escape From Freedom.^ He asks the following questions 
and answers them affirmatively: 
Can freedom become a burden, too heavy for man to bear, 
something he tries to escape from? ... Is there not also, 
perhaps, besides an innate desire for freedom, an instinc¬ 
tive wish for submission?^ 
Fromm proceeds to examine the mechanisms of escape. He specifies 
three: authoritarianism, destructiveness, and automation conformity. 
It is the third mechanism of escape, automation conformity, which he 
says is of the greatest social significance. Fromm describes this 
particular mechanism as the solution adopted by the majority of normal 
members of modern society and defines it as follows: 
To put it briefly, the individual ceases to be himself; 
he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to 
him by cultural patterns; ... The person who gives up 
his individual self and becomes an automation, with 
millions of other automations around him, need not feel 
alone and anxious anymore. But the price he pays, 
however, is high; it is the loss of his self. 
Returning to educational computing, we now ask two questions: 
(1) Will school administrators submit to the tendency to escape from freedom 
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and conform to the scientific cult of modern management 
to the point that they lose perspective of their exis¬ 
tential responsibility as educators? and (2) Will the 
computer, in serving to perpetuate standardized testing, 
measurement, and objective record-keeping, influence 
educators to make important decisions regarding students 
without "knowing" each individual student in the sense 
advocated by existential philosophers of education? 
Unfortunately, this author answers "yes," tentatively, 
to both questions and speculates that such is already 
happening. 
b. Negative Influences Upon Students 
Guiding the student in his search for self-identity, 
helping him in his struggle for an answer to the question 
"Who Am I?" is a paramount concern of the existential 
educator. Quoting from Morris: 
The educator’s task is to place at the 
disposal of the young as many different 
'climates’ as he can conceive of: ...From 
these ’climates’ the youngster's own self¬ 
hood will create its own climate: It will 
select out of this endless continuum of 
possible human experiences what it considers 
relevant to Its fulfillment as a unique 
and ultimate human self.9 
The student will make many errors in his choosing, for 
which he is responsible and may suffer. But no mistake is 
absolute in the sense that he cannot again choose, and thus 
redefine himself. This is the essential process of self- 
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definition. The individual, because of his subjective 
dimension, is open-ended; he never defines himself in 
an absolute sense; rather, he is always "becoming," 
continually defining himself through his choices. 
Again we refer to Morris: 
There is a kind of 'infinity' to the 
Existentialist conception of self 
so final and absolute as to prejudice 
in advance any 'definition' we might 
draw up of the Perfect Man. One of 
Existentialism's central tenets is 
that the Idea of Man is not yet finished. 
We help make this Idea with our lives, 
with our choices.I® 
Now, returning to the issue of educational data banks, 
it is obvious that such could permanently hinder an indivi¬ 
dual's efforts at re-self-definition. Therefore, it becomes 
more difficult to follow the old American tradition of 
"going West to get a clean start on life." The maintenance 
of an education file on the student contributes to what 
Schachtel calls a "paper-identity." (Schachtel does not 
address the automation dimension of this problem. He speaks 
of passports, driver’s licenses, etc., but the key charac¬ 
teristic of a paper-identity is that it is something fixed 
and definite.) Schachtel's central point is the association 
of a paper-identity with alienation, a major concern of the 
existentialist: 
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Such paper-identity seems far removed, 
at first glance, from the current concern 
of psychoanalysts, philosophers, and 
other students of the contemporary scene, 
with man's search for and doubt in his 
identity. But actually it is quite central 
to it. It is a telling symbol of alienated 
identity. It is a kind of identity which 
is the product of bureaucratic needs of 
commerce and administration.^ 
It is one thing, and bad enough, to have a paper-identity 
tagged onto an individual by a bureaucracy, However, the 
real tragedy occurs when the individual, in his "escape from 
freedom," accepts and acknowledges this identity, Schachtel, 
reflecting the concern of an existentialist, describes this 
tragedy: 
In our own and many other societies the loss 
of identity takes place without the terror 
of the concentration camps, in more insidious 
ways ,,, They tend to accept the paper- 
identity as their real identity. It is temp¬ 
ting to do so because it is something fixed 
and definite and does not require that the 
person be really in touch with himself. 
From an existential perspective the acceptance of a false 
objectified identity is the most dangerous pitfall to be 
associated with the continued expanded data banks by school 
administrations. It could serve to saddle the student with 
a fixed, definite identity—a package of adjectives similar 
to those describing the quality of meats in the butcher 
shop—which, unfortunately, only a few of the strong-minded 
fully reject. 
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2. Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI) 
In this section the expression "Computer Assisted Instruction" 
is used in the restrictive sense, implying the traditional drill 
and practice and tutorial modes only. (Other modes of CAI have 
been suggested, and these will be examined later.) At this point 
our intention is to illustrate that CAI, as it has been conven¬ 
tionally conceptualized and implemented, is not easily compatible 
with an existential education. 
The first and most conspicuous conflict arises because most 
traditional CAI systems are developed within the framework of 
a behavioristic model. The computer, usually via a remote 
terminal, presents some information and a question (the stimulus) 
to the student. The student answers the question (the response). 
The computer then examines the student’s answer relative to the 
objective of the lesson, presents its evaluation (positive or 
negative feedback) to the student, and starts the cycle over 
again by selecting and presenting more information and questions, 
Barry et al,, comments on the restrictiveness of this approach; 
.Much of the work in educational computing has been 
done by people who narrowly construe "computer-aided 
instruction" as an extension of programmed instruc¬ 
tion, and the computer as a successor to the Skin¬ 
nerian teaching machine.13 
Many favoring the scientific approach to behavior are satis¬ 
fied with the traditional form of CAI. However, the existen¬ 
tialist completely rejects the behavioristic model of man. 
For the existentialist, man is more than a "black box" whose 
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behavior can be conditioned and thus predicted by establishing 
the appropriate environmental conditions. Given the conflicting 
concepts of man held by the behaviorists and the extentialists, 
it is reasonable that their educational objectives would differ, 
as they in fact do. But CAI is not an educational goal; it is 
a methodology by which an objective is achieved. Thus an inter¬ 
esting and important question presents itself. Is it permissible 
for an educator to borrow the techniques of a philosophy of 
education contrary to the one he identifies with? Specifically, 
should the existentialist utilize tools of the behaviorist? 
Although there is no unequivocal answer to this question, it seems 
reasonable that the existentialist would be skeptical of their 
benefit. We will return to this issue in discussing educational 
methodology in the final chapter. 
A second concern with respect to traditional CAI is that of 
control. Within the behavioristic model it is the computer, not 
the student, that has primary control during the student- 
computer interaction. Even the teacher has a secondary role. 
Elliott,in her discussion of three representative CAI projects, 
identifies this situation as a negative aspect of traditional CAI 
Student and teacher control in these projects is 
limited. Students have some control over work 
sequences, over auxiliary materials they will use, 
and when they will start and stop. Teachers, in 
the same vein, have some authority over which 
'pre-packaged' materials they will give to stu¬ 
dents, and in some cases, they control the amount 
of time students will spend at terminals. 
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Lessons are doled out to students on 
a reward-punishment basis — if the 
sequence is correct, branch to the next 
sequence; if incorrect, try again. 
And, rigid roles are prescribed for 
teachers using this computerized 
material,14 
In that the existential educator prefers the student to have 
a maximum control over his educational experience, he would 
agree with this criticism. A small group of educators, recog¬ 
nizing this problem, have begun to investigate alternative modes 
of CAI which turn over control of the learning experience to 
the student. In Chapter V we examine their efforts with respect 
to existential educational philosophy. 
3, Indirect Psychological Influences 
In the two previous sections we examined the existential 
implications of administrative data banks and CAI. These are 
circumstances in which some overt action is taken—a student s 
file becomes part of an educational data bank or he participates 
in a CAI lesson. The student is directly affected by the presence 
of a computer. Here we propose to examine the more subtle 
influences of the computer within an educational environment. 
We ask: Does the computer, by its mere presence, have a psycho¬ 
logical impact on students, and, if so, what is the nature of 
this influence? We answer this question affirmatively. However, 
it must be stressed that this is a tentative answer. The question 
is complex and has not been researched. What follows should be 
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considered only as the speculations of this author and his 
rationale for such. 
We begin by acknowledging some merit to Marshall McLuhan's 
thesis, "the medium is the message," and then proceed to specu¬ 
late upon the "message" intrinsic to the computer. McLuhan, in 
his Understanding Media, issues a strong warning to beware of 
the naive notion, so often heard with respect to the computer, 
that technology is neutral and it is how it is used that is 
important: 
The electronic technology is within the gates, 
and we are numb, deaf, blind, and mute about 
its encounter with the Gutenberg technology, 
on and through which the American way of life 
was formed. It is, however, no time to suggest 
strategies when the threat has not even been 
acknowledged to exist. I am in the position of 
Louis Pasteur telling doctors that their greatest 
enemy was quite invisible, and quite unrecog¬ 
nized by them. Our conventional response to all 
media, namely that it is how they are used that 
counts, is the numb stance of a technological 
idiot, 
McLuhan has much to say about the subtle influences of elec¬ 
tronic technology. It is our intention here to bypass the intri 
cate detail of McLuhan’s work, and simply emphasize his point 
that electronic technology is not simply some neutral tool, 
to be used for good or evil purposes. We ask: What message, 
what values does the electronic digital computer communicate by 
its mere presence in our environment? Our investigation is 
similar to that of the cultural anthropologist who endeavors to 
ancient civilization by examining draw conclusions about an 
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the physical artifacts of that civilization, 
Although it is possible to find many "messages" within 
the computer, the most obvious is the high value our culture 
places on the objective scientific approach to problem- 
solving, More specifically, the computer can be visualized 
as the twentieth century epitome of rationalism. And, to the 
degree that the computer finds enthusiastic acceptance within 
the school, the message of the value of rationalism is trans¬ 
mitted to students. 
The existentialist would be concerned about the impact of 
the message of rationalism upon students. Carruth effectively 
articulates the existential position on rationalism: 
Existentialism is a recoil from rationalism. 
Not that existentialists deny the role of 
reason, they merely insist that its limits 
be acknowledged. Most of them would probably 
like to think their speculations are eminently 
reasonable, yet not rational; and they empha¬ 
size the distinction between terms.16 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, very little work 
has been done by the prominent existentialists in the area of 
epistemology. They are inclined to accept various methods of 
arriving at truth, including rationalism, but also insist on 
a subjective path to truth. (This was labeled "Mode Two" by 
Morris.) However, one leading existentialist, Martin Heidegger, 
has examined the nature of thinking, and his analysis is signi- 
of educational computing. Heidegger ficant within the context 
distinguishes between two types of thinking, calculative 
thinking and meditative thinking: 
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Whenever we plan, research, and organize, we 
always reckon with conditions that are given. 
We take them into account with the calculated 
intention of their serving specific purposes. 
Thus we can count on definite results. This 
calculation is the mark of all thinking that 
plans and investigates. Such thinking remains 
calculation even if it neither works with 
numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. 
Calculative thinking races from one prospect 
to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, 
never collects itself. Calculative thinking 
is not meditative thinking, not thinking which 
contemplates the meaning which reigns in every¬ 
thing that is. 
Heidegger defines man as a "meditative being" and indicates 
that his obsession with calculative thinking is symptomatic of 
man's flight from the essence of his humanity. Thus, although 
Heidegger does not address the impact of educational computing, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that he and other existentialists 
would take an opposing position if the computer were to dominate 
the educational environment in perpetuating the value of calcu¬ 
lative thinking at the expense of meditative thinking. 
The fact that educational technology can affect the atmos¬ 
phere of the school has not been generally recognized. 
Charles Silberman in Crisis in the Classroom is an exception. 
He quotes Emmanuel Mesthene, Director of the Harvard Program on 
Technology and Society, who seems to echo McLuhan: 
’What's good for educational technologists, 
Emmanuel Mesthene dryly warns, ’is not neces¬ 
sarily good for education,' The problem is 
part of a more general one, 'Our technologies 
today are so powerful, so prevalent, so delib¬ 
erately fostered, and so prominent in the 
awareness of people,' Mesthene argues, 'that 
they not only bring about changes in the 
physical world •— which technologies have 
always done — but also in our institutions, 
attitudes and expectations, values, goals, and 
in our very conception of the meaning of exis¬ 
tence . ' IS 
Although neither Silberman nor Mesthene identify themselves 
as existentialists, their concern with values, goals, and the 
meaning of existence as it relates to educational technology 
reflects a sympathy toward the existential position. 
Next, we proceed to an even deeper level and speculate upon 
the possibility of the computer influencing the student's 
concept of identity. Previously, when discussing Schachtel s 
notion of a "paper-identity," we were concerned with the student 
coming to identify himself with the image protrayed by the infor 
mation contained in a data bank. The content of the data bank 
may influence the student to conceive of himself as bright, 
dull, introverted, extroverted, creative, etc. It should be noted 
that each adjective depicts a quality which has historically been 
unique to human beings. Thus, even if the student came to 
picture himself as lacking in creativity, he was at least an 
uncreative human being. We now suggest what, upon initial inspec¬ 
tion seems almost preposterous, namely, that the presence of the 
computer can be instrumental toward influencing the child to 
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incorporate a mechanistic self-image. 
We begin by indicating that the issue of man being likened to 
a machine cannot be all that preposterous in that it has received 
the attention of serious philosophers during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as a theoretical issue. And, since the 
advent of actual mechanical "thinking" machines, most recently 
exemplified by the general-purpose digital computer, this idea, 
called mechanism, has been revived by modern philosophers of 
19 science. 
However, in that philosophers have also discussed angels 
dancing on the heads of pins, mere discussion of mechanism does 
not necessarily imply philosophical significance. Our immediate 
interest is psychological, not philosophical. We are concerned 
with an individual developing a warped sense of identity; that 
of a machine. (It is certainly questionable whether those 
philosophers who defend mechanism really believe that they them¬ 
selves are machines.) Dramatic evidence that a human being can 
actually assume such a mechanical self-image has been documented 
by Bruno Bettelheim in the case of Joey, a "mechanical boy": 
Entering the dining room, for example, he would 
string an imaginary wire from his ’energy source' - 
an imaginary electric outlet - to the table. There 
he insulated himself with paper napkins and finally 
plugged himself in. Only then could Joey eat, for 
he firmly believed that the 'current' ran his inges- 
90 
tive apparatus.^ 
Bettelheim indicates that Joey's story has general relevance 
to understanding emotional development in a machine age, and 
comments: 
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It is unlikely that Joey's calamity could befall 
a child in any time and culture but our own. 
He suffered no physical deprivation; he starved for 
human contact.21 
It should be emphasized that Joey is an extreme case of 
schizophrenia who suffered severe emotional deprivation before 
seeking comfort and safety in the identity of a machine. 
What is pondered here is nothing as dramatic as a future genera¬ 
tion of children adopting the identity of robots. What is of 
Interest is the cultural phenomenon which set the stage allowing 
Joey to assume the identity of a mechanism. We ask: Does that 
phenomenon, presuming that it does exist, have any influence, 
however subtle, upon the development of self-identity in "normal" 
children? And, of greater pertinence with respect to educa¬ 
tional computing, would not the presence of Intelligent 
machines serve to amplify this phenomenon? 
We assume an affirmative answer to the first question and 
leave the determination of the specifics to the social psycholo¬ 
gist. An answer to the second question, of course, presumes 
the existence of "intelligent" machines — or, at least the future 
existence of such machines. By adopting a strictly behavioristic 
interpretation of intelligence, we can and do make this assump¬ 
tion.22 The impact of this assumption of man's self-image Is 
profoundly related by James Slagel: 
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The presence of intelligent machines will 
show man that he is not the only intelligent 
creature. The effect of this on man's image 
of himself will be even greater than the 
effect of man's realization that he inhabits 
a minor planet revolving around a minor 
galaxy, or the realization that he evolved 
from lower forms of life. One of his more 
cherished, if not his most cherished, claims 
to uniqueness, that is, his intelligence, 
will be matched by a "mere" machine.23 
Scholarly discussion and debate surrounding the existence 
and implications of intelligent machines have been published in 
academic journals during the past three decades. However, this 
literature was esoteric from the viewpoint of the layman. 
Although there exists little evidence upon which to draw con¬ 
clusions regarding the layman's response to intelligent machinery, 
the public reaction to an article about "Shakey - The First 
Electronic Person" in a recent issue of Life Magazine indicates 
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that it is a disturbing notion for many people. 
The average person prefers to believe that human beings are 
special and any attempt to alter this belief is met with resis¬ 
tance. This "being special" is easily demonstrated by his 
intelligent behavior. He feels confident in this belief and is 
comfortable with it. Indeed, it is a part of the individual s 
identity as a human being. 
We now return to the question of young children coming into 
contact with machines which behave intelligently. While the adult 
with a healthy established identity either denounces the machine 
or attempts to philosophize his way around the issue, the young 
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child does not have an established identity which intrinsically 
rebels against a mechanistic model of himself. With a sense of 
concern, we ask if a child should not be sheltered from the 
computer to some degree, especially during his early educational 
experiences? Howard Peelle is one of the few educators to enter¬ 
tain the potentially negative influences of an artificially 
intelligent CAI system: 
The controversy becomes more heated with the 
mention of artificial intelligence, particu¬ 
larly mechanical mentors. What fate will 
befall education when machines become capable 
of sensitive and intelligent interaction with 
human beings? Rosenthal’s studies of self- 
fulfilling prophecy might suggest that chil¬ 
dren of tomorrow will mold to a new ortho¬ 
doxy - one of expected precision, pre-packaged 
behavioral objectives and programmed responses. 
Will students neglect humanistic values and 
perhaps even emulate the computer?2-* 
That educational computing, more specifically, artificially 
intelligent CAI systems, may subtly influence the child to adopt 
a mechanical self-image, is certainly open to debate. However, 
given the adverse implications of a mechanistic self-image, 
it is worthy of consideration. 
Perry London, in examining the machine model of man within 
the general context of behavioral control, comments on the danger 
of this model: 
The theoretical trouble with calling a man 
a machine begins when it is clear that someone 
believes the statement is true, and not mere y 
a figure of speech; the practical trouble begins 
when anyone can act as if it were true, whether 
he believes it or not.26 
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London continues by examining the dangers of the mechan¬ 
istic model of man from a humanistic perspective of morality; 
There are two important reasons for fearing 
the easy application of mechanistic theory 
to morality: it may encourage an impersonal 
approach to human beings, and it may dis¬ 
courage personal responsibility for one’s 
conduct.27 
Although London does not identify himself as an existen¬ 
tialist, his concern for a personal approach to people and respon¬ 
sibility for one's actions are essentially that of the existen¬ 
tialist. And, for just the same reasons, the existentialist is 
critical of the machine model of man. Thus, to the degree that 
an intelligent CAI system communicates this model of man, it 
would be unwelcome by an educator who is advocating an exis¬ 
tential philosophy of education. 
C. Philosophical Insights; Beyond the Negative Dimension of 
Educational Computing 
In this section the question is raised: Why not, in light of the 
aforementioned dangers inherent in educational computing, simply deny 
the computer entrance to the school house? The author, while acknowledg¬ 
ing the legitimacy of this response, decides not to endorse such a course 
of action. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to articulating 
the philosophical rationale behind this decision. 
We begin by emphasizing that the potential dangers specified in 
the previous section were psychological, not philosophical. Educational 
computing could subtlely influence both students and educators to lose 
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of their existential condition. However, educational computing does 
not overtly present an intellectual argument that can effectively 
persuade those individuals to reject the existential position. 
In our concern with the indirect negative psychological influ¬ 
ences of educational computing, we must speculate on the cause of 
susceptability to these influences. The author contends that the 
primary source of this problem is the void with respect to an estab¬ 
lished conscious philosophy of education. Into this void creeps the 
unspoken "philosophy" of pragmaticism, efficiency and objectivity of 
our modern culture (see Chapter II). To avoid this condition, the 
author recommends the adoption of an existential philosophy of 
education. If the prerequisite existential environment were estab¬ 
lished, the pitfalls associated with educational computing would be 
minimizing. This is an important "if." It is a primary motivation 
behind this author’s advocacy of an existential philosophy. For, ulti 
mately, it is the absence of such a philosophy which sets the stage 
for the aforementioned negative psychological influences. 
In developing a philosophy of educational computing, it is 
imperative that there be no inconsistencies between the basic exis¬ 
tential tenets as outlined in the previous chapter and the philosophic 
insights provided by the science o£ cybernetics. Here we briefly 
describe cybernetics as a broad theoretical framework encompassing 
digital computing. Unfortunately, because cybernetics is a science, 
and existentialism is often associated with anti-scientific sentiments, 
many educators draw the erroneous conclusion that cybernetics and 
existentialism are intellectually incompatible. In the following 
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sections the author will attempt to further and draw upon cybernetic 
insights in defense of the existential position. This is not to say 
that there is any necessary association between these two bodies of 
knowledge. The author intends only to convince the existential 
educator that cybernetics does not present a philosophical challenge 
to his position. Then he may be convinced to give the computer 
a chance within his classroom. 
Before we examine these philosophical issues, it is worth stating 
a "realistic," though nevertheless existential, objection to rejecting 
educational computing. In general, the existentialist acknowledges 
the impossibility of establishing a vacuum devoid of influences 
contrary to his position (in particular, this applies to educational 
computing). In fact, it is his unwillingness to accept and his naive 
or simplistic approach to education, or life in general, that sets him 
apart from the traditional philosophers. And he recognizes that exis¬ 
tential growth of the individual can only occur when the individual 
confronts, struggles with, and overcomes influences which are 
dehumanizing, 
While we are discussing this issue philosophically, Pandora’s Box 
has been opened. The computer is here and it cannot be banished into 
non-existence. The existential educator, in accepting this reality, 
must therefore meet the challenge and learn to control the computer. 
He must also guide his students in their association with educational 
computing. The pitfalls of educational computing can be minimized by 
establishing an educational environment which reflects an existential 
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philosophy of education. They cannot be completely eliminated. 
Thus, the existential educator must move beyond these pitfalls by 
developing an understanding of the computer within his philosophical 
perspective. 
1. Cybernetics: An Introductory Overview 
During the 1940’s and 1950's Norbert Wiener and his associates 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began investigating 
analogies of control between animals and machines. He named this new 
science "cybernetics," which he derived from the Greek term 
"kybernetike" meaning the art of steersmanship. Wiener’s definition 
of cybernetics as "the study of control and communication in the animal 
and the machine" has become the standard. ^ During the same time period 
that Wiener was laying the foundation of cybernetic theory, the digital 
computer was being developed. The computer, being the most sophistica¬ 
ted control and communication mechanism ever invented, proved invaluable 
in cybernetic research. 
In the broadest sense of the term, "cybernetics" is the study of 
control and communication per se, without reference to specific 
scientific disciplines. However, research in artificial intelligence 
and automata theory has often been equated with cybernetics. 
Artificial Intelligence. (A.I.) involves the programming of compu¬ 
ters to perform tasks which require some measure of "intelligence. 
Examples of such programs already developed are those which play 
checkers, solve algebra and calculus problems, and prove mathematical 
theorems.29 According to Minsky, A.I. involves the application of 
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algorithmic and heuristic techniques to global problems of search, 
pattern recognition, learning, planning, and induction.30 
Whereas researchers in A.I. endeavor to actually construct 
programs which behave intelligently, those involved with automata 
theory focus on the abstract structure of various classes of computers. 
Theirs is a theoretical investigation of the formal properties of 
computers without immediate concern toward the actual construction of 
the machines they study. Arbib offers a more precise definition of 
automata theory as "the pure mathematics of computer science...con¬ 
cerned with understanding the capabilities and limitations of whole 
classes of automata."3^ 
The relevancy of cybernetic concepts extends far beyond the 
esoteric areas of artificial intelligence and automata theory. Neuro¬ 
physiologists, psychologists, management theorists, and practitioners 
within other scientific disciplines have found cybernetic models 
useful when examining communication and control functions within 
their respective disciplines. Wiener himself, in his The Human Use of 
Human Beings, argues for the most comprehensive application of 
cybernetic thought, that of the social sciences. He states: 
It is the thesis of this book that society 
can only be understood through a study of 
the messages and the communication facilities 
which belong to it; and that in the future 
development of these messages and communica¬ 
tion facilities, messages between man and 
machines, between machines and man, and be¬ 
tween machine and machine, are destined to 
play an ever-increasing part.^ 
Given that cybernetics has such a profound impact in providing 
new models for both the physical and social sciences, it is only 
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natural that philosophers begin their examination of this new subject. 
We turn our attention to the issues raised by these lovers of wisdom 
in the following two sections. 
2, Existential Man vs. Mechanism; A Cybernetic Perspective 
You will recall that in Chapter III the point was made that exis¬ 
tentialism is first and foremost a philosophy of man—specifically, 
man as a subjective being. The task of the existential philosopher 
is to examine this unique and profound dimension of man. In this 
section we focus upon the science of cybernetics, in particular the 
area of artificial intelligence, and speculate upon its implications 
with respect to our subjective notion of man. Kenneth Sayre, in his 
Philosophy and Cybernetics, effectively articulates the nature and 
significance of this issue: 
Given the ability of machines to learn, act 
purposefully, and perform tasks which with the 
human agent require mental skills, it is un¬ 
avoidable that the question arises whether man 
himself is anything more than a cybernetic 
system, constructed of organic rather than 
inorganic parts... . The question of the signi 
ficance of artificially intelligent mechanical 
systems is one of the most pressing philosophical 
issues of the present day.33 
Sayre, in presenting his own analysis of this question argues as 
a philosopher of science, not an existentialist. However, this author 
while taking the existential position, finds Sayre's analysis both 
enlightening and appealing. His conclusion—that mechanism is not 
subject to empirical verification—is consistent with the existen¬ 
tialist , but in no way belittles or sets 
limits upon cybernetic research. 
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Much of what follows in this section is dependent upon Sayre's 
excellent analysis. 
In attempting to evaluate the "organic machine" concept of man, 
Sayre specifies a crucial distinction between two propositions which 
he labels A and M: 
Mechanism may be represented by the thesis (M) that 
all men are machines. Arguments both for and 
against mechanism, on the basis of cybernetic consi>- 
derations, owe their persuasiveness to the logical 
relations between M and the thesis (A) that machines 
can do everything men can do. Although M entails A, 
the converse does not hold, for it is possible that 
men and machines do the same things but do them in 
irreducibly different ways.34 
Some philosophers, in challenging the validity of M, have tried 
to identify some human behavior which a machine was incapable of dupli¬ 
cating. Then, having shown A to be false by counterexample, they would 
evoke a "not-A, therefore not-M" argument to disprove M. The logic is 
valid. The debate centers around the identification of a given 
behavior to establish a counterexample to A. 
This author, speaking from an existential position, does not 
attempt to disprove A (and thus M) by aligning himself with those who, 
like Hubert Dreyfus, claim to have found such counterexamples.^ 
Instead, the bold assumption is made here that at some point in the 
future a machine will indeed be able to duplicate all human behavior. 
This statement is premised upon current and projected successes in A.I. 
and the theoretical possibility of such as indicated by automata theory 
At this point in time, this assumption is at best scientific specula¬ 
tion which must await significant engineering advances for verification 
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The existentialist, by postulating the subjective dimension of man, 
does not endeavor to reject M by empirical demonstration of a counter¬ 
example to A. Rather, he believes that it is more effective to 
accentuate Sayre’s distinction between A and M. This captures the 
crucial difference between DOING (A) and BEING (M). Noting this 
important philosophical distinction, this author concurs with Sayre 
regarding the impossibility of empirical verification of M. 
...the remarkable advances in artificial intel¬ 
ligence over the past decade do not in them¬ 
selves alter the philosophic status of the 
mechanist thesis. Mechanism remains a matter 
of philosophic persuasion and has not been 
altered into an issue admitting definitive 
settlement by empirical considerations.36 
It is important to recognize that Sayre’s position is that of 
a scientific philosopher. Cybernetics, being a science, is bounded 
by the limitations of the scientific method. It can only legitimately 
ask and answer questions which are subject to empirical verification 
by sense observation. All other questions are considered meaningless. 
What men and machines can DO is empirical and therefore meaningful. 
What man IS is a metaphysical question and therefore meaningless 
within the domain of the philosophy of science. The existentialist, 
being of a different "philosophic persuasion" than the scientific 
philosopher, finds this question not just meaningful, but of central 
philosophic concern. 
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3. Existentialism and Cybernetics 
The intention of the previous section was to illustrate the 
absence of any intellectual inconsistency between the science of 
cybernetics and the existential concept of man. Although the exis¬ 
tentialist may be justifiably concerned over the psychological 
impact of the cybernetic revolution, he should not perceive cyber¬ 
netics as a philosophical threat to his position. Cybernetics is 
a science. It is not a philosophy, even though it may be subject to 
philosophic interpretation. And, as we shall see in Chapter V, 
science, in general, and therefore cybernetics in particular, poses 
no threat to the existential position. 
The purpose of this section is to examine some of the results of 
cybernetic research. Here we will do what is not permitted within 
the structure of pure scientific research, namely, place philosophical 
interpretations upon the conclusions of the cybernetics. Our inten¬ 
tion is to illustrate that, assuming one has already made the "leap" 
into existentialism, cybernetics, rather than merely being tolerated, 
may be viewed positively. Specifically, existential interpretations 
will be attached to cybernetic conclusions to reinforce the exis¬ 
tential position with respect to the issues of rationalism, intelli¬ 
gence, and behavior, 
a. Rationalism 
Earlier in this chapter we referred to Carruth in specifying 
the existential position regarding rationalism - "Existentialism 
is a recoil from rationalism. Not that the existentialists deny 
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the role of reason, they merely insist that its limits 
be acknowledged. The existentialists’ claim is tradi¬ 
tionally based upon their awareness of significant philo¬ 
sophical insights found only within the subjective domain. 
A classic example of this attitude was found in Blaise 
Pascal, himself gifted with a brilliant rational mind. 
Pascal was both the father of probability theory and, of 
more direct interest, the inventor of the first mechanical 
adding machine. Barrett, in his Irrational Man, classifies 
Pascal as an existentialist. He draws the distinction 
between Pascal’s thought and that of other philosophers 
who discussed existential themes but are better described 
as precursors of existential thought. Barrett’s primary 
reason for categorizing Pascal as an existentialist is 
Pascal’s bold distinction between the mathematical mind 
("1’esprit de geometrie") and the intuitive mind 
(’’l’esprit de finesse"): 
What Pascal had really seen, then, 
in order to have arrived at this 
distinction was this: that man 
himself is a creature of contradic¬ 
tions and ambivalences such as pure 
logic can never grasp... By delimit¬ 
ing a sphere of intuition over against 
that of logic, Pascal had, of course, 
set limits to human reason. -3° 
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All existentialists, in the spirit of Pascal, assert 
the existence and priority of the intuitive mind and, in 
doing so, postulate limitations to the purely rational path 
to philosophic truth. However, it also happens that the 
limitations of the rational method can be demonstrated by 
application of the rational method itself. In the early 
1930’s, Kurt Godel established two theorems in the realm of 
metamathematics which are of profound significance to the 
philosopher of science. Essentially, Godel was able to 
demonstrate two important limitations to any purely 
rational system of thought. The essence of these two 
theorems, which have become known as Godel's Incompleteness 
Theorems, is best illustrated by Howard DeLong, who has 
"translated" them into both the languages of physics and 
psychology: 
Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem: 
Language of physics - There is no consis¬ 
tent machine which can be programmed 
to produce all the true and only true 
sentences of arithmetic. 
Language of psychology - There is no consis¬ 
tent human capable of formulating a 
program, which if carried out, would 
produce all the true and only true sen¬ 
tences of arithmetic. 
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Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem: 
Language of physics - No consistent machine 
can be programmed to prove its own 
consistency. 
Language of psychology - No consistent human 
can prove his own consistency.39 
»• 
Godel developed his limitative theorems within the 
framework of the philosophy of mathematics. With the advent of 
the digital computer, and thus automata theory, parallel proofs 
of Godel’s theorems were developed by automata theorists. 
The existentialist, in examining the implications of the 
digital computer, should be aware of Godel's theorems as 
reinforcing his position on rationalism. However, few exis¬ 
tentialists have given any indication of such. DeLong comments 
that, "So far as I know, the leading existentialists are 
completely innocent of any knowledge of the limitative 
theorems. 
This author has found only one exception to DeLong’s obser¬ 
vation. Barrett, taking an existential perspective, comments 
on the implications of Godel’s theorems: 
Godel's findings seem to have even more 
far-reaching consequence, when one consi¬ 
ders that in the Western tradition, from 
the Pythagoreans and Plato onward, mathe¬ 
matics as the very model of intelligibility, 
has been the central citadel of rationalism. 
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Now it turns out that even in his 
most precise science — in the province 
where his reason had seemed omnipotent - 
man cannot escape his essential finitude: 
every system of mathematics that he con¬ 
structs is doomed to incompleteness. 
Godel has shown that mathematics contains 
insoluble problems, and hence can never 
be formalized in any complete system. 
This means, in other words, that mathe¬ 
matics can never be turned over to a giant 
computing machine; it will always be un¬ 
finished, and therefore mathematicians - 
the human beings who construct mathematics - 
will always be in business. The human ele¬ 
ment here rises above the machine: 
mathematics is unfinished as is any human 
life.41 
Thus we see that there are inherent limitations within 
the rational method. However, it should be recognized by 
the existentialist that it is to the credit of rationalism 
for displaying its own limitations. Also, it should be recog¬ 
nized that these limitations imply that mathematics will 
always remain an unfinished enterprise - an unending, rich 
and exciting domain for the creative mind to explore. 
These limitations are the subject of our existential 
interpretation of rationalism. Again we turn to Barrett for 
his analysis: 
But since mathematics can never be completed, 
it might be argued that Godel’s findings show 
us that there are no limits to mathematical 
knowledge. True, in one sense; but in another 
sense it sets a more drastic limitation upon 
mathematical knowledge, since mathematicians 
now know they can never, formally speaking, 
reach bottom; in fact, there is no rock bottom, 
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since mathematics haB no selfsubsistent 
reality independent of the human activity 
that mathematicians carry on. And if 
human reason can never reach rock bottom 
(complete systematization) in mathematics, 
it is not likely to reach it anywhere else. 
There is no System possible for human exis¬ 
tence, Kierkegaard said a century ago, 
differing with Hegel, who wished to enclose 
reality within a completely rational struc¬ 
ture; the System is impossible for mathe¬ 
matics, Godel tells us today.^2 
It is important to avoid the error of concluding that 
Godel's demonstration of the limitations of the rational 
method, and thus of computing devices, provides proof of 
man's superiority to machines. Godel's theorems apply to 
the method per se, not to the agent which employs the method. 
Thus, Godel's theorems cannot be referenced as an illustration 
of a fundamental difference between men and machines. They 
can only demonstrate limitations to a method of investigation 
about which existentialists have long held reservations. 
Again, if the existentialist claims to have knowledge of 
phenomena beyond the rational, then he does so by virtue of 
his "leap" into this philosophic domain of subjectivity, not 
by rational demonstration. 
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b. Intelligence 
In the previous section we examined rationalism, 
a particular epistemology which has appealed to Western phil¬ 
osophers in their pursuit of truth, and made reference to 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorems to reinforce the existential¬ 
ist’s contention regarding its limitations. We now expand 
our range of interest to focus on intelligence per se. 
The underlying epistemology may be rationalism, empiricism, 
or some blend of these two. Our intention is to argue the 
existential point that intelligence is neither the primary 
nor uniquely identifying characteristic of man. Here the 
term "intelligence" is to be interpreted in a strictly be¬ 
havioristic sense, equivalent to Heidegger's "calculative 
thinking." It is distinct from Heidegger’s "meditative think¬ 
ing," which has no immediate or necessary behavioristic mani¬ 
festations and is representative of the subjective dimension 
of man which is unique to him alone. 
The argument is simple and direct. If research into A,I. 
indicates that beings other than man in this case, the 
digital computer—are intelligent, then intelligence cannot 
be interpreted as the primary identifying characteristic of 
man which sets him apart from the rest of creation. Slagel 
captures the essence of this argument in the following comments 
84 
The presence of intelligent machines 
will show man that he is not the only 
intelligent creature. The effect of 
this on man’s image of himself will be 
even greater than the effect of man's 
realization that he inhabits a minor 
planet revolving around a minor sun in 
a minor galaxy, or the realization that 
he evolved from lower forms of life. 
One of his most cherished, if not his 
most cherished, claims to uniqueness, 
that is, his intelligence, will be 
matched by a 'mere' machine.43 
A hint of the logic behind this argument can also be 
detected in an amusing essay by Bertrand Russell entitled 
"An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish'"; 
Aristotle, so far as I know, was the first 
man to proclaim explicitly that man is a 
rational animal. His reason for this view 
was one which does not now seem very impres¬ 
sive; it was, that some people can do sums. 
...Nowadays, however, calculating machines 
do sums better than even the cleverist people, 
yet no one contends that these useful instru¬ 
ments are immortal, or work by divine inspira¬ 
tion. As arithmetic has grown easier, it has 
become less respected. The consequence is 
that, though many philosophers continue to 
tell us what fine fellows we are, it is no 
longer on account of our arithmetical skill 
that they praise us.^ 
Although it would be inaccurate to call either Russell or 
Slagel existentialists, the existentialist should appreciate 
the logic in their statements as supportive of his position. 
The presence of "intelligent" machines has stimulated much 
discussion regarding the nature of intelligence. The continued 
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success In A. I. research has forced a changing definition 
intelligence, influencing J. P. Echert, a pioneer in 
the development of the digital computer, to comment: 
"I've finally been forced to adopt the definition that 
thinking is what computers cannot do. This definition 
is very workable since it changes from year to year as 
computer progress is made."^ 
If one presumes, as this writer does, that at some 
point in the future computers will be capable of simula¬ 
ting any type of intelligent behavior, then Echert's 
definition of "thinking" becomes null for those who 
would only acknowledge the existence of "calculative" 
thinking. This is fine to the existentialist, for in 
postulating the existence of "meditative" thinking, man 
is still valued because he is uniquely "man" - a medita¬ 
tive/subjective being - not because he demonstrates the 
useful quality of intelligence in a behavioristic sense. 
c. Behavior 
In the previous section it was argued that the exis¬ 
tence of intelligent machines reinforced the existential 
contention regarding the secondary position of behavior¬ 
istic intelligence (calculative thinking) as a charac¬ 
teristic of man. Here a parallel argument is proposed 
by finally extending the domain of discourse from intel¬ 
ligent behavior to behavior per se. 
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From a strictly philosophical perspective, the exis¬ 
tentialist holds that man is "defined" by what he IS 
(a subjective being), not by what he DOES (behavior). 
And, once man IS - exists aware of his subjectivity - he 
further defines himself via his choosing. This is not to 
say that behavior is not important. Rather, just the oppo¬ 
site is maintained. However, it is man as a subjective being 
who initiates the behavior by a nonbehavioristic choice. 
And it is man as a subjective being who experiences the exis¬ 
tential anxiety in choosing and who is responsible for the 
consequences of his choosing. Thus, behavior per se, is 
considered secondary to subjective choice by man. 
Now, turning our attention toward a specialized area of 
A.I. research, that of robiotics, we can reinforce the exis¬ 
tential position on behavior. Arguing in a vein similar to 
that proposed in the previous section on intelligence, we 
state that it is erroneous to seek a definition of "humanity 
in terms of behavior alone. Of course, it is the assumption 
that robots will actually evolve to the androids of science 
fiction literature which is the weakest link in this position. 
And, admittedly, this is at best scientific speculation at 
this point in time. Yet, it is not speculation without foun¬ 
dation. Researchers at Stanford have already constructed 
46 
a robot which was "science fiction" only a few decades ago. 
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Although the behavior of this robot, and all others 
built to date, is quite unsophisticated in comparison 
to human behavior, it should persuade most observers 
that no more than a few hundred years of technological 
evolution will be necessary for robots to catch up 
to humans. 
Only future events will definitively establish the 
behavioristic equivalence of men and machines. The dog¬ 
matic empiricist will demand the actual construction of 
such an android. However, it is of tremendous impor¬ 
tance that there exists no theoretical barriers to this 
task. This has been demonstrated by automata theorists 
in proving the logical equivalence of a finite automata 
(a formal computer) and a neural net (a formal model of 
the nervous system).^ Essentially, this means that 
the construction of robots capable of simulating human 
behavior is exclusively an engineering problem, albeit 
a formidable one. Seymour Papert, one of the more 
creative individuals in CAI research, has specifically 
argued this point in refuting Hubert Dreyfus, a philo¬ 
sopher who claims that there are limitations to the 
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potentiality of AI research. 
In arguing against the priority of behavior within 
an ontological investigation of man, there are other cyber¬ 
netic insights which the existentialist may draw upon. 
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The problematic relationship between a system's 
structure and its behavior is of central concern to the 
cybernetician. Although his goal is to predict the be¬ 
havior of a known structure, and conversely, to determine 
a system's structure by examining its behavior (the "black 
box" problem), the cybernetician is among the first to 
acknowledge the perplexing nature of this relationship. 
Charles Dechert precisely articulates this enigma: 
It is entirely possible, of course, 
that structurally diverse systems 
may effect identical transformations, 
and that structurally identical sys¬ 
tems of a sufficient degree of com¬ 
plexity may produce very different 
outputs on the basis of identical 
inputs.49 
Therefore, in recognition of this condition, the exis¬ 
tentialist can effectively argue against those who advocate 
mechanism ("All men are machines") if and when robots are 
constructed which are behaviorly equivalent to human beings. 
Men and machines "may effect identical transformations,' but 
they may still be "structurally diverse systems." 
In this section we have been using the term "behavior” 
in the conventional sense as the layman would interpret it. 
Next we focus upon the psychology of strict stimulus-response 
"behaviorism" as professed by Skinner. 
Clearly, the existentialist is at odds with the behavionst 
In fact, it is for this reason that some 
model of man. 
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psychologists of the rival "third force" human potential 
movement have turned to existentialism in search of 
a philosophical foundation for their psychological posi¬ 
tion. Abraham Maslow, often referred to as the father 
of this recent movement in psychology, credits the exis¬ 
tentialists for offering a more acceptable image of man 
than those proposed by both the Freudians and behaviorists. 
He states, in an essay entitled "What Psychology Can Learn 
from Existentialists" that: 
We can, and should, pick up their 
greater emphasis on what they call 
"philosophical anthropology," that 
is, the attempt to define man, and 
the differences between man and any 
other species, between man and 
objects, and between man and robots. 
What are his unique and defining 
characteristics? What is so essen¬ 
tial to man that without it he would 
no longer be defined as man?50 
The existentialist and many humanistic psychologists 
postulate the subjectivity of man as capturing his unique¬ 
ness, They must postulate this because it is impossible 
to demonstrate in the scientific sense. Actually, it is 
the Skinnerian behaviorist who is capable of offering 
a scientific defense of his stimulus-response model of 
man. However, the existentialist may again find some 
interest in a cybernetic rejection of the stimulus*- 
response model. We turn to Michael Arbib who argues 
against this model: 
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In short, we cannot expect a full 
understanding of human mental 
processes if we follow those 
psychologists who view the organism 
as responding passively to a series 
of stimuli in a way which can be 
manipulated by some schedule of 
reinforcement. Rather, we must 
include a description of the inter¬ 
nal state of the system which deter¬ 
mines what the organism will extract 
from its current stimulation in 
determining its current actions and 
modifying its internal state.51 
Arbib, in arguing for the necessity of some internal 
state within an organism, proposes the cybernetic model 
as being superior to the stimulus-response model. 
He certainly is not defending the existential "model." 
His position is entirely within the scientific area. 
However, he does effectively challenge the purely 
behaviorist model of man - something for which the 
existentialist should be grateful. 
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D. Concluding Comments 
The primary intent of this chapter has been to outline the 
potential dangers to an existential education inherent within educa¬ 
tional computing and then move beyond those dangers. The approach 
was to illustrate that the problems exist within the realm of psychology, 
and that an examination of the philosophic insights provided by cyber¬ 
netics displayed no necessary inconsistencies with existential tenets. 
Thereafter, it was claimed that the existentialist, in placing his own 
interpretation on cybernetic advances, could reinforce his own conten¬ 
tions regarding the secondary philosophic importance of rationalism, 
any form of behavioristic intelligence, and finally, behavior per se. 
Turning to the educational implications of this analysis, we simply 
note that the underlying concepts of an existential education remain 
unaltered. However, in the areas of educational policy and practice, 
those existentialists who would bar the computer from the school house 
can only claim personal preference as their justification. Since the 
computer is not necessarily incompatible with an existential education, 
this author, as an advocate of existential philosophy, can legitimately 
research and recommend specific educational policy and practice 
pertaining to educational computing. The next and final chapter is 
devoted to this purpose. 
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CHAPTER V 
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND PRACTICES 
This concluding chapter is devoted to the examination of specific 
educational policy and practices which the author feels to be consistent 
with the philosophy of educational computing presented in Chapter IV. 
In particular, the issues of educational curriculum, methodology, and 
administration will be treated. 
The author recognizes that the concepts of curriculum, methodology, 
and administration usually imply the presence of some educational institu¬ 
tion which further implies a collectiveness and rigidity contrary to the 
individuality and openness advocated by existentialists. Therefore, 
the reader is advised to interpret these terms in the most unrestricted 
sense, 
The reader should also bear in mind that the priority of freedom 
within an existential educational experience practically eliminates the 
exposition of specific educational policy and practices for adoption by 
all existentialists. (This helps to account for the fact that very little 
has been said by existential educators beyond the outlining of general 
philosophical principles.) Therefore, what follows should in no way be 
perceived as absolute or dogmatic. Rather, the discussion of curriculum, 
methodology, and administration, as they relate to educational computing, 
is no more than an elaboration of the position of one person, the author, 
and his rationale for its compatibility with the existential creed. 
Curriculum 
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In this section the author intends to defend the legitimacy of 
computer science £er se within the curriculum of an educational 
institution committed to existential principles. The contention 
that the curriculum be exclusively oriented toward the humanities 
(in a restricted sense) is rejected. Rather, the openness of 
the curriculum, and the freedom within it, as articulated by Dupuis, 
is reaffirmed; 
The existentialist is not so much concerned with 
the actual courses or subjects in the curriculum 
as he is with what the teacher and (most 
especially) the student does with them. 
The exercise of freedom within the curriculum 
is more important than the curriculum content.^ 
The author firmly believes that computer science can be presented 
to students at both the elementary and secondary levels in such 
a manner that the goals of the existential educator are not jeopar¬ 
dized, but realized. This position is grounded in the assumption 
that the educator comprehends and, somehow effectively, communicates 
to his students a valid "humanistic/existentialistic" perspective of 
science in general, and cybernetics in particular. The following 
discussion of science and cybernetics is presented to convince the 
reader that computer science, as is any area of scientific investiga 
tion, is a uniquely human enterprise with a significant, subjective 
dimension. In other words, computer science can, and should be, 
presented to the student as a subject within the humanities (in the 
broadest sense of the term). 
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^ * Science: An Existential Commentary 
To effectively argue for the inclusion of science in the 
academic curriculum of an existential education requires 
a comprehensive analysis of the scientific method and its 
historical evolution. Such is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, a brief discussion of (a) the relationship of science 
and technology, and (b) the domain and limitations of the scien¬ 
tific method is presented by referring to prominent scholars 
and specifying their conclusions. Readers, and especially exis¬ 
tential educators, are strongly encouraged to investigate the 
original sources referenced for a more thorough analysis of 
these issues. 
a. Technology and Science 
One reason that existentialists and other humanists 
take a disparaging view of science, and thus discourage 
its inclusion within the curriculum is due to their 
distress and anger at the dehumanizing conditions of 
the twentieth century, made possible, promoted, and 
aggravated by modern technology. They make the accurate 
observation that current technological advances have 
their source in prior scientific research. Generally, 
the scientist makes a discovery pertaining to natural 
phenomena; the engineer then draws upon this new 
scientific knowledge to produce some new technology. 
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Although it is technology that is the "villain," 
criticism is often leveled at both science and 
technology. Strain's comments are restated as 
being representative of this position: 
In terms of its content, modern existen¬ 
tial thinking focuses on the human 
person in a technological and scientific 
age. Many existentialists are pessi¬ 
mistic about modern life and indicate 
that utopianism, based on science, is 
an illusion. They believe science and 
technology have brought human beings 
loneliness and alienation rather than 
peace and progress. The institutionaliza¬ 
tion of science, by and for the state, 
has dehumanized man.2 
In arguing the legitimacy of science within the 
existential curriculum we begin by emphasizing that, 
even though modern technology is often derived from 
scientific research, science and technology are indeed 
distinct. Next, and perhaps more important, is the 
little-recognized fact that technology based upon 
science is a uniquely modern phenomenon; there is no 
necessary correspondence between the two. Lynn White, 
a historian with particular interest in medieval 
technology, informs us that: 
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century 
there were remarkably few connections 
between science and technology, and the 
influence of technology upon science seems 
to have been greater than the reverse. 
Science through the ages was purely an 
intellectual effort to comprehend nature; 
technology was the practical attempt to 
use nature for human purposes. While a 
few individuals, like Friar Roger 
Bacon, and Galileo, were interested in 
both, they showed little interplay between 
their practical and theoretical concerns.^ 
Thus we see that technology is not a necessary 
by-product of scientific investigation. Rather, it is 
the obsessive pragmaticism of our modern culture which 
compels technology to immediately follow scientific 
advances, and even initiate the scientific research in 
the first case. Lilly sadly informs us of this 
situation: 
In the American tradition, one rushes to 
the end of a research project digging up 
all the basic facts needed to apply the 
results practically to some technological 
advances. This seems to be the major basis 
for research in America today: a practical 
result.^ 
Returning to the issue of science within the exis¬ 
tential curriculum, it is this writer's contention that 
science, as a search for truth--the goal of both the 
existential philosopher and the real scientist—should 
be emphasized within an existential education. 
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The pragmaticism, which dominates the experimental 
curriculum, would be minimized. This would not mean 
the elimination of engineering from the curriculum. 
It would imply that the spirit of science as an 
effort to comprehend the natural world would prevail. 
Hopefully, this spirit would influence the community 
of scientists and engineers to avoid the current 
tendency of immediately applying scientific progress 
toward technological endeavors. The applications of 
science would require a thoughtful decision, in the 
existential sense involving personal responsibility 
and anxiety, before the engineer applies his skills. 
b. The Domain and Limitations of Science 
A second reason proposed by existential/humanistic 
educators for de-emphasizing science within the curri¬ 
culum is that the scientific perspective offers too 
narrow a view of man and the universe. It is this 
author's intention to draw an important distinction 
between science per se and that brand of philosophy 
of science which claims that truth can only be approached 
via scientific investigation and that only scientifically 
verifiable statements can be considered to be philoso¬ 
phically meaningful. 
It should be noted then that a justifiable rejec¬ 
tion of the latter restrictive philosophy of science 
102 
in no way implies a rejection of science itself. 
It only implies the rejection of a particular 
philosophical disposition toward science. 
The position stated herein is that, although 
the existential educator is naturally of a dif¬ 
ferent philosophical persuasion, science can 
and should be part of the existential curriculum. 
The rationale for this position is derived 
from what this writer believes to be a legitimate 
interpretation of science. It is one thing to 
postulate the philosophical significance of a domain 
broader than the scientific; this is sufficient for 
the confirmed existentialist. It is another thing 
to "objectively" analyze the scientific method and, 
in doing so, simultaneously illustrate both its 
limitations and its subjective/creative dimension: 
this will not only reaffirm the existentialist, but 
perhaps will also convert the experimentalist. 
A thorough exposition of the legitimate domain 
and limitations of the scientific method is a compre¬ 
hensive undertaking. An excellent reference in this 
respect is Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution. Here we only highlight Kuhn’s observa¬ 
tions and comment on their relevancy to existential 
epistemology. 
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Modern science has as its goal the deter¬ 
mination of truth with respect to the empirical 
world. Thus, naturally, any statements made by 
the scientist must be subject to empirical veri¬ 
fication. However, science is more than just 
a collection of facts. It has a theoretical compo¬ 
nent which requires the scientist to define a set 
of axioms, which he claims to be empirically 
verifiable, and then deduce theorems from these 
axioms, which likewise must be empirically verified. 
In this respect, the scientist parallels the rational 
processes used by the mathematician. And it is here 
that the scientist must acknowledge the incomplete¬ 
ness of his system which Godel demonstrated by his 
Incompleteness Theorems.-* 
The recognition of the theoretical deductive 
element within the scientific method also exposes the 
necessity for creative thought in the selection of 
initial axioms. (Kuhn specifies the beginning of 
a scientific revolution to be the "discovery" of a 
new set of axioms which are logically consistent and 
the theorems derived prove to be a more accurate 
description of the empirical world.) 
Therefore, due to its rational component, we see 
that science not only suffers (and enjoys) the same 
incompleteness as mathematics, but it also requires 
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a similar type of creative mind to produce 
a rich set of initial axioms. It is this 
openness and creativity with respect to both 
science and pure mathematics which justify 
their position within the existential curri¬ 
culum. And, granting the tremendous challenge 
in doing so, it becomes the responsibility of 
the existential educator to acquaint the student 
with this dimension of science. Unfortunately, 
most educational institutions, existential and 
otherwise, display little awareness of this 
situation. 
The existential educator should also be aware 
that Kuhn's analysis of science implies an inter¬ 
pretation of the concept of truth which parallels 
his own in removing the notion of one absolute 
reality for the human mind: 
We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish 
the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes 
in paradigm carry scientists and those who 
learn from them closer and closer to truth. 
. . .We are all deeply accustomed to seeing 
science as the one enterprise that draws con¬ 
stantly nearer to some goal set by nature in 
advance. But need there be any such goal? 
Can we not account for both science's exis¬ 
tence and its success in terms of evolution 
from the community's state of knowledge at 
any given time? Does it really help to 
imagine that there is some one full, objective 
true account of nature and that the proper 
105 
measure of scientific achievement is 
the extent to which it brings us closer 
to that ultimate goal? If we can learn 
to substitute evolution-from-what-we-do- 
know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish- 
to-know, a number of vexing problems may 
vanish in the process.6 
Kuhn’s analysis of the scientific method effec¬ 
tively demonstrates the limitations of this method 
in the determination of truth, and even questions the 
existence of "truth" as an objective reality. Unfor¬ 
tunately, the existentialist often overlooks such an 
analytic verification of his position, which he has 
simply assumed. 
The previous comments on the distinction of science and tech- 
nology and the limitations of science in capturing "truth" are on 
the intellectual level and thus should be acknowledged by both 
the scientist and the existentialist. Karl Jaspers, in his essay, 
"Philosophy and Science," asserts the recognition the philosopher 
must afford the scientist. Yet, he also recognizes that truth 
extends beyond the domain of science. The following statements by 
Jaspers provide an insight into the relationship he sees between 
science and philosophy: 
There is no tenable philosophy outside the sciences. 
Although conscious of its distinct character, 
philosophy is inseparable from science. It refuses 
to transgress against universally binding insight. 
Anyone who philosophizes must be familiar with 
scientific method. 
Any philosopher who is not trained in a scientific 
discipline and who fails to keep his scientific 
interests constantly alive will inevitably bungle 
and stumble, and mistake uncritical rough drafts 
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for definitive knowledge. Unless an idea is subjected 
to the coldly dispassionate test of scientific inquiry, 
it is rapidly consumed in the fire of emotions and 
passions, or else it withers into a dry and narrow 
fanaticism.^ 
Jaspers emphasizes the importance of recognizing the limits to 
the scientific method: 
Moreover, anyone who philosophizes strives for scientific 
knowledge; it is as though the most significant insights 
could be achieved only through man's quest for the limit 
at which cognition runs aground, not seemingly and tempo¬ 
rarily, but genuinely and definitively, not with a sense 
of loss and despair, but with a sense of genuine internal 
evidence. Only definitive knowledge can make definitive 
nonknowledge possible; it alone can achieve the authentic 
failure which opens up a vista, not merely upon the dis¬ 
coverable existent, but upon being itself. 
In accomplishing the great task of dispelling all magical 
conceptions, modern science enters upon the path that 
leads to the intuition of the true depth, the authentic 
mystery, which becomes present only through the most ^ 
resolute knowledge in the consummation of nonknowledge. 
Jaspers briefly summarizes his position: 
To sum up: The sciences do not encompass all the truth 
but only the exact knowledge that is binding to the 
intellect and universally valid. Truth has a greater 
scope, and part of it can reveal itself only to philo¬ 
sophical reason. 
It is this attitude of Kuhn, the philosopher of science, and Jaspers, 
the existentialist, which should be recognized by existential educators and 
communicated to students where science enters into the curriculum. How¬ 
ever, it is just this attitude which C. P. Snow, in his essays on 
"Two Cultures," has lamented as being absent from the culture of modern 
Western civilization. His comments provide insight into a situation which. 
unfortunately, many scientists and existentialists continue 
to perpetuate: 
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Over the years I became convinced that the whole 
of Western society was being polarized, with the 
literary intellectuals at one pole and the physical 
scientists at the other. Between the two was 
mutual incomprehension, and the chance of talking 
across this gap was getting less and less. This 
polarization resulted in immense loss to each group, 
and in fact posed a great danger for our society as* 
a whole.y 
Snow comments that it would be wrong to be too impressed by 
this historical trend and gives his reasons why efforts should be 
made to reverse it: 
If they are illiterate in science, then they are going 
to take those decisions like a lawyer reading a brief. 
That’s a terribly bad way to make a decision.10 
Snow continues by stating his main reason for combating this 
scientific and literary polarization; 
My main reason is much simpler, much more emotional, 
much more involved in what I feel about the whole of 
the human species. This absence of intellectual 
communication is a symbol of the tendency of our 
kind to find methods of ceasing to talk... These in 
the long run mean death.H 
The concern Snow expresses in the decision-making process, 
and the lack of communication resulting in death for the human 
species, has an existential ring. With guarded optimism, he sees 
education as being the only process by which the polarization trend 
may be reversed. It is a challenge which the existential educator 
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must accept, from both a philosophic position as specified by 
Jaspers, and a realistic concern for human survival as specified 
by Snow. 
2. Cybernetics: An Existential Commentary 
Given that science should have a legitimate position within 
the existential curriculum, it follows that the collection of 
academic disciplines encompassed by cybernetics should be inves¬ 
tigated by elementary and secondary students. The issue raised 
at this point concerns the specific contribution cybernetics has 
to offer as a subject within an existential curriculum. Although 
the following comments should provide some insight into this 
matter, this topic is examined with the primary intention of 
setting a challenge before the existential educator. 
Cybernetics, in its broadest interpretation, is defined as 
the science of control. In capsulizing this perspective of cyber¬ 
netics as proposed by Stafford Beer, Peter Schoderbek notes its 
interdisciplinary application: 
Cybernetics is seen as the science whose object 
of study is control. It aims to study the nature 
of control per se, control common to many fields 
of investigation. Hence, its interdisciplinary 
nature, hence its relevance to industrial, social, 
economic, mechanical, and biological systems. 
The existentialist, in his concern for the individual as a being 
capable of free choice and, therefore, being in control of his own 
behavior, should find the science of control of interest. Unfor- 
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tunately, most cybernetic research has a distinctly nonr 
existential orientation. It has primarily emphasized the objec¬ 
tive over the subjective, the collective over the individual, and 
goal achievement over desirability of said goal. Although this 
approach may be necessary and entirely justifiable within the 
pragmatic sphere, it is too restrictive within the existential. 
Geoffrey Squires accurately expresses the nature of this situa¬ 
tion in stating that "the trouble with information—processing 
is that it implies, at present, a very mechanistic and reduc¬ 
tionists view of how people work."13 The existentialist is 
challenged to bring his own perspective to cybernetics and 
hopefully move beyond this mechanistic, reductionistic approach. 
Squires, in specifying the broad range of control systems, believes 
this is possible, and credits John Lilly as being representative of 
this approach: 
Systems, after all, are found in biology and 
ecology, as well as in engineering and opera¬ 
tions research. As for information-processing 
and the language of computing generally, 
writers like Lilly can apply it to the human 
organism without doing violence to notions of 
choice, affectivity, religious experience and 
the like. Indeed, Lilly's work can be seen 
as pioneering in this respect.1^ 
This author chooses to echo Squire’s endorsement of Lilly. 
Lilly's Programming and Metaprogramming the Human Biocomputer 
is a fascinating, although esoteric, attempt to tackle the mind<- 
body problem, utilizing the vocabulary of the computer scientist 
while avoiding mechanism.13 While Lilly’s ideas must be judged on 
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their own merit, they do provide a model of an extension of 
cybernetic concepts into the humanistic domain. 
Another attempt to extend cybernetic concepts beyond 
mechanism can be found in the writing of Gregory Bateson. 
R. D. Lang, a leading existential psychiatrist, credits Bateson 
for achieving a major theoretical advance in analysis of schizo¬ 
phrenic experiences: 
This was the 'double-bind' hypothesis, whose 
chief architect was the anthropologist 
Gregory Bateson. This theory...represented 
a theoretical advance of the first order... 
Bateson brought this paradigm of an insoluble 
'can't win' situation, specifically destruc¬ 
tive of self-identity, to bear on the internal 
communication pattern of families of diagnosed 
schizophrenics.16 
Bateson claims that his double-bind theory has its base "in 
that part of communications theory which Russell has called the 
Theory of Logical Types."17 Essentially, Bateson perceives the 
double-bind concept as a cybernetic concept. He has applied this 
and other cybernetic concepts in the fields of psychology, anthro¬ 
pology, and epistemology. In recognition of the productivity of 
the cybernetic model, he states: 
I think that cybernetics is the biggest bite 
out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that 
mankind has taken in the last 2,000 years.18 
Yet, Bateson also displays the wisdom of not becoming 
infatuated with this model: 
Ill 
Cybernetics has integrity within itself, 
to help us not to be seduced by it into 
more lunacy, but we cannot trust it to 
keep us from sin. 
Bateson, in an existential vein, warns us of the threat to 
human responsibility if we focus only on cybernetic inventions 
(e.g., computers). Only by taking a more global perspective of 
cybernetics does he see "the means of achieving a new and perhaps 
more human outlook, a means of changing our philosophy of control, 
and a means of seeing our own folly in wider perspective."^ 
Lilly and Bateson are unique examples of scholars capable of 
utilizing cybernetic concepts without coming into conflict with 
the existential position. Both can be perceived as pioneers in 
extending the cybernetic model into the domain of humanistic 
thought. 
Turning to a more conventional issue, the position of computer 
science within the curriculum, we ask if there are any existential 
insights to be discovered there. This question is answered 
affirmatively by referring to the previous chapter. There it 
was shown that artificial intelligence can lead the examiner to 
a re-evaluation of the philosophic significance of intelligent 
behavior. And, within the discipline of automata theory, there 
can be found certain limitations to machines. While recognizing 
that neither of these disciplines verifies the existential posi¬ 
tion, they do illustrate the existential issues and provide food 
for thought. 
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The next section examines the role of educational computing as 
a methodology. Before turning to this topic, it is important to 
note here that one particular technique of utilizing the computer 
to teach traditional elementary and secondary subjects involves 
computer programming on the part of the student. We will examine 
this in detail below. It is mentioned here for the purpose of 
noting an overlap between the inclusion of computer programming 
within the curriculum and computer programming as a useful method¬ 
ology for teaching certain cognitive skills. 
Methodology 
In the previous chapter concern was expressed over the potential 
negative implications of traditional CAI designed according to the 
behavioristic model. These programs usually incorporated the drill- 
and—practice, or the tuotrial mode, with the dominant feature being 
that the student was under the control of the system. From an exis¬ 
tential perspective, this is undesirable as a general methodology. 
In this section the reader will be exposed to the efforts of a rela 
tively small group of educational technologists whose research is 
premised on models other than behaviorism. While none of these indi¬ 
viduals could be labeled "existentialist," their efforts are directed 
toward a more humanistic approach to CAI, and to the degree that exis 
tentialism is a humanism, the methodologies proposed by these indivi¬ 
duals are compatible with an existential education. It should be 
noted that the primary intent of these alternative modes of CAI is 
the same as traditional CAI: the teaching of cognitive skills. 
However, their salient asset is that they attempt to do so without 
jeopardizing the affective dimension of an existential/humanistic 
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educational experience. 
Although a variety of educational computing experiences 
are proposed by these individuals, there is an underlying concept 
common to all their work. Namely, the student controls the 
computing system, and thus controls his educational experience, 
not the opposite as in behavioristic modes of CAI. A most 
appropriate way to capture the spirit of this approach is to 
quote Seymour Papert's introductory comments in his 
"Teaching Children Thinking''^ 
The phrase ’technology and education' usually 
means inventing new gadgets to teach the same 
old stuff in a thinly disguised version of 
the same old way. Moreover, if the gadgets 
are computers, the same old teaching becomes 
incredibly more expensive and biased toward 
its dullest parts, namely, the kind of rote 
learning in which measurable results can be 
obtained by treating children like pigeons 
in a Skinner box. 
The purpose of this essay is to present a 
grander vision of an educational system in 
which technology is used not in the form of 
machines for processing children, but as 
something the child himself will learn to 
manipulate, to extend, to apply to projects, 
thereby gaining a greater and more articulate 
mastery of the world, a sense of the power 
of applied knowledge, and a self-confidently 
realistic image of himself as an intellec¬ 
tual agent .21 
Papert, working with elementary school students, has developed 
a number of interesting projects to implement his idea of placing 
the computer under the control of the student. In most cases 
the student actually programs the computer in order to concretize 
and elucidate his thought process. In order to facilitate 
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the writing of programs by children, he has developed a special 
programming language called LOGO and a unique peripheral device, 
a turtle-robot which the children can control via instructions 
written in LOGO. By writing programs to manipulate the behavior 
of the turtle (it can move along the floor and is equipped with 
light, sound, and writing mechanisms), the student can observe 
an embodiment of his procedure designed to achieve a particular 
goal (e.g., make the turtle draw a polygon on the floor). 
A very simple, but significant, point is that the student comes 
to interpret misbehavior by the turtle as a "bug" in his program, 
something to be fixed and tried again, thereby avoiding the nega¬ 
tive experience of "being wrong." Papert has also had students 
write simple heuristic AI programs that play games of strategy 
(e.g., NIM), and even has had students write traditional CAI 
programs based on the premise that the best way to learn something 
is to teach it. 
By turning the computer over to the student, one is more 
inclined to become involved in a project which encourages 
a personal commitment toward some goal. This personal involve¬ 
ment in an educational experience is favored by both experimen¬ 
talists and existentialists. That such involvement also parallels 
the work pattern of the artist, the existential ideal, is specified 
by Papert: 
The most exciting single aspect of the experiment 
was that most children acquired the ability and 
motivation to work on projects that extend in time 
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over several days, and even weeks. This is 
in marked contrast with the usual in mathe¬ 
matics classes, where techniques are taught 
and then applied to small repetitive exer¬ 
cise problems. It is closer, in ways that 
are essential to latter argument here, to 
the work style of some art classes where 
children work for several weeks on making 
an object; a soapcarving, for example. 
The similarity has several dimensions. 
The first is that the duration of the process 
is long enough for the child to become involved, 
to try several ideas, to have the experience of 
putting oneself in the final result, to compare 
one's work with that of other children, to dis¬ 
cuss, to criticize and to be critized on some 
basis other than 'right or wrong.' The point 
criticism is related to a sense of creativity 
that is important in many ways...including its 
role in helping the child develop a healthy 
self-image as an active intellectual agent.22 
Another educator sympathetic toward student control of compu 
terlzed learning is Howard Peelle of the University of Massachu¬ 
setts. Peelle is an advocate of a "glass box" approach to com¬ 
puter instruction which synthesizes ideas put forth by Seymour 
Papert and IBM's Kenneth Iverson and Paul Berry. He describes 
this concept: 
In this approach, short, quickly comprehensible 
computer programs are given to elementary 
school children for their direct viewing. 
Each program embodies a concept, a procedure, 
or an interrelationship, and is written as 
simply and clearly as possible. Here the 
inner workings of the program are visible and, 
hence, become a basis for learning. 
This approach 
a 'glass box' 
definition of 
and elucidate 
the structure 
uses a computer program more as 
than a 'black box.' The formal 
such a program serves to reveal 
concepts; that is, by observing 
of the program and its behavior, 
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key understandings may become transparent 
to the student. 
In contrast to conventional computer-- 
assisted instruction (CAI), this glass 
box approach allows the student signi¬ 
ficant control over his learning processes. 
Making the full power of the computer 
accessible to the learner is 180° from 
the kind of CAI characterized by programmed 
instruction or drill^and-test sequences.23 
Peelle illustrates the glass box concept with examples from 
the areas of traditional CAI, psychology, cybernetics, and 
computer art. His description states that "student-initiated, 
student-responsible, success-oriented" activities can result from 
a more imaginative approach to educational computing. 
A third educator worthy of recognition for his contributions 
in the instructional applications of computers is Thomas Dwyer 
of the University of Pittsburgh. Dwyer, probably more than any 
other educator actively involved with educational computing, 
emphasizes the significance and priority of sound educational 
principles. In an article entitled "Some Principles for the 
Human Use of Computers in Education," he ties educational computing 
into the humanistic approach to education: 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a personal 
view of some principles that are derived from 
the humanistic point of view, but which are in¬ 
tended as a guide for programs exploring the use 
of computers in education. It is my conviction 
that this simple ordering of priorities - 
principles first, application second - is the 
real key to successfully tapping the full potential 
of the new technologies. 
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The most common mistake is to use the machines 
to emulate classroom procedures that have 
come out of expediency, not thoughtful reflec¬ 
tion. This is precisely why principles are 
needed; a rationale, based on a fresh look at 
what it is we are about, is the horse that 
should pull the technological cart.24 
Dwyer proposed five principles to be adhered to in the 
design of computer learning experiences.2^ In doing so, he 
echoes the spirit of student—controlled learning advocated by 
Papert and Peelle in noting that each of his five principles 
is "based on a belief in the value of learner control of certain 
key aspects of his education. 
The humanistic principles described by Dwyer have been 
incorporated in a secondary National Science Foundation supported 
mathematics educational project known as Project Solo. In this 
project, the student engages in what Dwyer calls "learner-devised 
processing" by writing, debugging, and executing computer 
programs, and, at a higher level, engages in "learner-organized 
processing" which involves program design and construction for 
learners other than himself.2^ 
In examining the methodologies proposed by Papert, Peelle, 
and Dwyer, we note two common sentiments. On the negative side, 
there is dissatisfaction with conventional CAI systems patterned 
after the behavioristic model of learning. On the positive side, 
there is the intention to turn the power of the computer over 
to the student and allow him to control and become responsible 
for his own educational experience. It should be added that 
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advocating student control does not necessarily banish 
traditional CAI as a methodology. It is the issue of control, 
not technique, which is paramount. Thus, under certain circum¬ 
stances, the student may freely elect to initiate a CAI program 
to guide his learning experience. The most important restric¬ 
tion is that he maintain the option of changing that experience. 
By stating that traditional CAI may be permitted within an 
existential education, we have given an affirmative answer to 
a question raised in the previous chapter. There we pondered 
the advisability of an existential educator utilizing the 
methodology closely linked to an opposing philosophy of education. 
(We assume that the computer is more closely associated with the 
philosophies of realism and experimentalism.) The important 
qualification in this affirmative response is that the exis¬ 
tentialist has the sensitivity to detect and inhibit the "tail 
wagging the dog" phenomenon. 
That an existentialist may successfully utilize the techniques 
of an opposing theory is illustrated by Bugental in his psycho¬ 
therapeutic practice. Bugental, an existentialist, rejects the 
psychoanalytic metapsychology of Freud, yet freely borrows clinical 
techniques associated with Freudian psychoanalysis. Bugental 
properly credits the success of these techniques but specifically 
comments that "In regard to these borrowings from psychoanalytic 
theory, it should be noted that I particularly emphasize the clinical 
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aspects rather than the conceptual and theoretical." 
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We conclude our discussion of methodology by emphasizing 
that it would be presumptuous to state that the authors just 
referenced are advocates of an existential philosophy of 
education. If a philosophical label were to be attached to 
them, based on their writing, "humanistic experimentalist" 
(in the spirit of John Dewey) seems most applicable. Their 
research is primarily concerned with the development of cogni¬ 
tive skills in students by placing them in humanistic, open- 
ended and stimulating environments which contain computers. 
Although this paper does not examine their methodologies 
in detail, the reader is strongly encouraged to investigate the 
references cited. The philosophical position advocated in this 
paper is existential, not experimental. Therefore, the develop¬ 
ment of cognitive skills is perceived as secondary, and the 
epistemology supporting the growth of cognitive skills is open- 
ended. Yet, within the existential position, the development of 
cognitive skills is very important. And speaking from this 
position, this writer strongly endorses the methodologies men¬ 
tioned herein. First, because they appear to be most promising 
in promoting cognitive growth. Second, and more importantly, 
because they appear to do so without doing violence to the exis¬ 
tential concern with the subjective "I" in each student. 
Therefore, while the aforementioned authors may be indifferent to 
the existential position, the existential educator may freely 
adopt their proposed methodologies. 
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. Administration 
In considering the appropriate role of computer technology in 
educational administration, we should begin by addressing the notion 
of educational administration per se within the perspective of an 
existential philosophy of education. Unlike educational curriculum 
and methodology, which must exist in some form, no matter how flexible 
and open-ended, it is possible (and perhaps very desirable) to engage 
in an educational experience without an administrative super¬ 
structure. The classical one-room school house and many progressive 
alternative schools function quite well without the services of 
administrators. (Let us say that an educational situation has an 
administration when it utilizes administrators—individuals who are 
not teachers in the sense of being directly involved with the student's 
exposure and response to the curriculum—for example, superintendents, 
principles, counselors, security officers, etc.) 
Recall that the existentialist is concerned with the individual 
student and his immediate human "I - Thou" relationship with the teacher. 
Therefore, the existential educator is not sympathetic toward education 
occurring within the context of a school system with its institutional, 
organizational, bureaucratic structures. Somehow, institutions, organi¬ 
zations, and bureaucracies tend to become self-serving entities in 
which the individual is reduced to a cog in a mechanism for achieving 
some collective goal. It is within the context of system that schooling 
becomes mistaken for education. The student is perceived as raw 
material entering the school system, being processed by that system, 
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and outputed (sic) in a mold specified by the requirements of our 
economic institutions. 
It is institutions, organizations, and bureaucracies that 
basically need administering by some administration; ideally, indivi¬ 
duals require no such administration, and it is the administration of 
a school system, not the individual student, that necessitates the 
maintenance of an automated data processing system. Therefore, in light 
of this situation, the existential educator may legitimately reject the 
establishment of an administrative computing system. In fact, to the 
degree that the computer promotes systemization by making it possible, 
the existentialist is likely to resist administrative data processing. 
While acknowledging the validity of existential resistance to any 
form of administrative data processing within an educational setting, 
this author chooses to adopt a more qualified position, which is based 
on the recognition that the essential problem is the institutionaliza¬ 
tion of the educational process, not automated data processing per se. 
It is also based on the existential proposition that the educator must 
realistically recognize the situation he finds himself in. He is alive, 
here and now, in twentieth century America, and education is encom¬ 
passed in bureaucratic structures. A choice must then be made: either 
to make a radical break with the institutionalized school, or try to 
maintain an existential integrity "within the system. Either choice 
is valid. The former would involve participation in an alternative 
educational environment without an inhibiting administration, and thus 
no administrative data processing. The latter choice the personal 
choice of this writer—is not so clear-cut and requires some important 
qualification. 
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To begin with, the existential educator who chooses to become 
involved with administrative computing should be aware that he must 
maintain a delicate balance. It is practically inconsistent, to be 
philosophically opposed to systematized education, yet willing to 
participate to a certain degree. The author's resolution of this 
situation involves the proposal of guidelines, not the presentation 
of a tactical solution. 
First, such an educator must remain aware of his philosophical 
position. If he is involved in an educational institution, his goal, 
be it romantic and highly improbable, is the evolution of that insti¬ 
tution toward an existential environment. While the attainment of 
this objective may verge on the impossible, the only hope lies in 
the second proposed guideline: the educator's personal involvement 
with his students must be of an existential nature. Granting that 
this may be very difficult, it should not be impossible. The educator 
can function in a humanly responsible manner toward his students, 
regardless of the institution's failure to do so. Herein lies the 
strength and hope of the existential creed. The individual educator 
may not have it within his power to initiate a crusade toward institu¬ 
tional reform; but neither does the institution have ultimate control 
over his decisions. He does have the potential to make many decisions 
and establish associations in a humanistically existential manner. 
The institutional environment may work against this, while an alter¬ 
native environment may promote such. Yet, in the same way that an 
existential environment cannot guarantee that the individual educator 
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will become existentially-oriented, neither can an institutional 
environment necessarily inhibit the existential practice of the 
committed educator. 
We conclude this discussion of administrative data processing 
within an existential education by stating that each independent 
application must be closely examined and evaluated. It seems 
reasonable that there exists no danger in a school administration 
employing computer technology to handle situations which may be 
classified as logistical. This would include such standard functions 
as payroll, accounting, budgeting, and inventory control. One should 
view with strong suspicion any systems which could serve as a basis 
for a data bank for student performance. The potential negative impact 
of such was specified in the previous chapter. However, there is no 
specific set of guidelines to follow. 
Accordingly, the educator is bound to judge each application on 
its own merits, and the environment in which it will be utilized. 
This may place the educator in the position of making some very 
difficult and unfavorable decisions. Existentially, he is bound to 
do so. Ultimately, although he is within the system, he is not a part 
of it. 
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